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THE BASIS FOR LIABILITY FOR DEFAMATION
BY RADIO
By

T

LAWRENCE VOLTD*

rapid and effective development of radio broadcasting
from rudimentary beginnings to gigantic proportions that has
taken place in the last decade has exposed innocent victims as
never before to the ravages of "character assassination" by farflung radio publication of defamatory utterances.' The facts inHE

*Professor of Law, University of Nebraska College of Law, Lincoln,
Nebraska.
In explanation of any contentiousness unwittingly coloring the argument
in the present paper, the writer deems it proper to submit the following
personal statement. In the later stages of the litigation in Sorensen v. Wood,
here discussed, after the arrangements for the contemplated test case on the
second appeal had been completed by the parties, he was called in as attorney
for the plaintiff to prepare and present to the higher courts the plaintiff's
side of the argument on the applicable law. He accordingly prepared the
plaintiff's brief on the second appeal to the supreme court of Nebraska and
appeared before that court as the plaintiff's attorney when that appeal was
called for argument.
The writer's first direct connection with this interesting litigation w%-as
in the character of amicus curiae on the first appeal. The present paper
aims in the spirit of that character to set forth the various considerations
involved.
1
Broadcasting was unknown until the fall of 1920. In 1927, at the time
of the adoption of the Federal Radio Act, there were 733 broadcasting
stations. Interference with reception of programs occasioned by far too
many improperly located and improperly conducted stations was the immediate inducement to the resort to federal regulation under the Federal Radio
Act. In 1928 the number of stations had through administration of the
Federal Radio Act been reduced to 696, in 1930 to 618, and in 1932 to 607.
(Data taken from (1929) 54 A. B. A. Rep. 439, 442, 443, 447; (1930) 55
Ibid 405; (1932) 57 Ibid 455.)
A recent summary by the American Bar Association's Standing Coinmittee on Communications vividly indicates the magnitude of the present
radio broadcasting industry as follows:
"Actual investments (571 stations and the major chain companies) total
$48,000,000.00. During 1931 gross receipts amounted to $77,758,048.79; gross
expenditures, to $77,995,405.68 which included $20,159,656.07 for talent and
programs, $16,884,436.91 for regular employees, $4,725,168.32 for equipment,
and $36,226,144.47 for miscellaneous expenditures.
"Profits without counting depreciation were reported for 333 stations
aggregating $5,451,717.05 and varying from $13.94 to $376.279.00 for particular stations. Losses similarly computed were reported for 180 stations,
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volved in such publication by radio are in the instance new. What
is the proper application of the already established law to the
novel facts involved in defamation by radio? Faced with lack
of direct precedent in point as to the facts, and with various
sharply conflicting analogies available as possible persuasive authority, a court in such cases necessarily must make some sort
of choice among possible alternatives as to what basis for liability
is in the instance properly to be regarded as applicable.2
The case of Sorensen v. Wood, s recently decided by the supreme court of Nebraska, seems to have been the first case to
reach an appellate court on this question. This case held that the
aggregating $2,200,743.76 and varying from $22.50 up to $178,535.72 in the
case of a company operating two stations." (1932) 57 A. B. A. Rep. 455, 461.
As recorded by the census of 1930 there were 15,000,000 radio receiving
sets with an estimated total of 50,000,000 radio listeners. See U. S. Daily,
Oct. 17, 1932, at p. 1481.
For a wealth of general information and bibliographical material touching the radio industry, see Journal of Radio Law, volumes 1 and 2. See also
current
numbers of the Air Law Review.
2
"The social policy that will prevail in many situations may run foul
in others of a different social policy, competing for supremacy. It is then
the function of a court to mediate between them, assigning, so far as possible,
a proper value to each, and summoning to its aid all the distinctions and
analogies that are the tools of the judicial process." Cardozo, J., in Clark v.
United States, (1933) 289 U. S. 1, 13, 53 Sup. Ct. 465, 77 L. Ed. 993, 999.
"It is a familiar maxim of the common law that when the reason of a
rule ceases the rule also ceases." Hughes, C. J., in United States v.
Chambers, (1934) 291 U. S.217, 54 Sup. Ct. 434, 436, 78 L. Ed. 763.
For systematic exposition of the juristic problem involved in judicial
choice between conflicting analogies present among the authorities, see
Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process; Cardozo, The Growth of the
Law; Cardozo, Paradoxes of Legal Science; Pound, Theory of Judicial
Decision; (1923) 36 Harv. L. Rev. 641, 802, 940; Pound, Juristic Science
and Law, (1918) 31 Harv. L. Rev. 1047.
Since the problem presented in cases of defamation by radio involves
such a choice among possible alternatives for controlling application in this
new instance, the discussion in the present paper is devoted to analysis of
the facts and of the underlying conflicting considerations at stake in the
choice of analogy to be adopted as controlling. Accordingly, familiar and
leading representative authorities are cited for the familiarly recognized
rules of law invoked in the course of this discussion, but no attempt is made
at exhaustive citation of authorities for such familiarly recognized rules
of law.
3(1932) 123 Neb. 348, 243 N. W. 82, 82 A. L. R. 1098. An attempted
second appeal in this case (no. 28749, unreported) was by the Nebraska
supreme court dismissed on May 18, 1933, the court considering that this
case had become moot by reason of asserted satisfaction of tile
plaintiff's
judgment by defendant station pending appeal. An order denying a rehearing
on that question was later entered. From this order the defendant station
appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States, but its appeal was
there dismissed for the reason that the judgment of the state court sought
to be reviewed was based on a non-federal ground adequate to support it.
See K F A B Broadcasting Co. v. Sorensen, (1933) 290 U. S. 599, 54 Sup.
Ct. 209, 78 L. Ed. 527.
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broadcasting station was subject to liability under the law of
defamation for unprivileged defamatory utterances spoken into
its microphone by a paying political speaker and transmitted to
the radio public by its broadcasting operations. The case also held
that the broadcasting station was not entitled to any privilege for
defamatory utterances under the terms of the Federal Radio Act.
In reaching its conclusion the court intimated that defamation by
radio is properly to be dealt with as libel rather than as slander,
at least where the defamatory utterances broadcast are read into
the microphone from a prepared manuscript. In taking its position regarding the underlying basis for liability the court followed the analogy of the law of defamation as applied to newspapers, the direct business competitors of broadcasting stations in
the dissemination of commercial advertising for profit.
It is the purpose of this paper to support the conclusion that
radio stations are properly subjected to the same basis for
liability for publication of defamatory utterances that is applied
to newspapers.'
I. DEFAMATION, NOT NEGLIGENT CONDUCT, IS THE UNDERLYING
BASIS FOR LIABILITY

Under the law .of defamation as ordinarily applied the publisher is held absolutely liable for the publication of unprivileged
defamatory utterances no matter how careful he may have been.'
Under the law of negligence, on the other hand, liability to injured
parties is imposed upon the perpetrator of damage only in case of
failure to use due care.8
4The discussion in the present paper proceeds on the assumption that
where the broadcasting station's own announcer for the occasion speaks the
unprivileged defamatory words into the microphone, the publication of which
is complained of, the basis for liability of the broadcasting station is the
law of defamation. In this paper it will be indicated that the law of defamation is equally applicable where the unprivileged defamatory utterances of
others spoken into the microphone are transmitted to the understanding of
radio listeners by the voluntary active broadcasting operations of the radio
station.
5Peck v. Tribune Co., (1909) 214 .U. S. 185, 29 Sup. Ct. 554, 53 L. Ed.
960; Washington Post Co. v. Chaloner, (1919) 250 U. S. 290, 39 Sup. Ct.
448, 63 L. Ed. 987; Walker v. Bee-News Publishing Co.. (1932) 122 Neb.
511, 240 N. W. 579; Laudati v. Stea, (1922) 44 R. 1. 303, 117 Atl. 422. 26
A. L. R. 450; Morrison v. Ritchie and Co., (1902) 4 F. (Scot.) 1016. 39
Sc. L. R. 432; Hebditch v. McIlwaine, [1894] 2 Q. B. 54, 63 L-J. Q. B. 587;
E. Hulton & Co. v. Jones, [1910] A. C. 20, 79 L. J. K. B. 198; Cassidy v.
Daily Mirror Newspapers, [1929] 2 K. B. 331, 98 L. J. K. B. 595.
'The instances are innumerable. A few leading cases are the following:
Brown v. Kendall, (1850) 60 Mass. 292; The Nitro-Glycerine Case. (1872)
15 Wall. (U.S.) 524, 21 L. Ed. 206; Losee v. Buchanan, (1873) 51 N. Y.
476; Brown v. Collins, (1873) 53 N. H. 442.
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The problem of choice between these tvo alternatives as the
basis for liability in cases of defamation by radio involves two
quite distinct phases. 1. Do the physical operations performed by
the broadcaster in transmitting by radio the defamatory utterances
spoken by outsiders given access to the microphone amount to
publication by the broadcaster as well as by the speaker? Obviously, unless the broadcaster is a publisher, the traditional law
of defamation is not, without more, applicable to him. 2. Would
it be socially advantageous in the instance, as a matter of policy, to
excuse the radio broadcasting publisher from the strict law of
defamation applicable to other publishers, and instead to apply to
him the law of negligence? More especially, should this be the
conclusion when in the instance the utterances are spoken by an
outsider given access to the broadcaster's microphone? 7
Stated in another way, these questions involve the problem of
how wide or how narrow a range it is socially advantageous to
include within the term "publication" when applying the already
established law to the novel facts of radio broadcasting.
1. Broadcasting Operations Involve Both Speaker and Broadcaster.-The popularly familiar mechanical arrangements connected with radio broadcasting readily lend themselves to the
misconception that, like ordinary telephonic transmission, the process of broadcasting is purely automatic. Persons who are misinformed as to the exact details often imagine that the highly
sensitive broadcasting equipment, when charged with a current of
electricity, automatically transmits to the far-flung radio audience
the words of the speaker as uttered into the microphone. This
erroneous popular impression regarding the physical operations
of broadcasting has become the basis for an argument or assumption that the radio broadcaster, as distinguished from the speaker
7When inquiry regarding the basis for liability is followed out in this
systematic manner, several problems regarding possible incidental application
of the law are readily clarified, the intermingling of which in loose discussion
of defamation by radio has occasioned much confusion. There is thus readily
identified in the first place the original and vital underlying question of
whether defamation or negligence is to be recognized as the applicable basis
for liability. That inquiry is dealt with herein at footnotes 8-82, with
accompanying text. Quite distinct, in the second place, is the question of to
what extent one's negligent conduct in connection with publication by others.
as in the case of the carrier or news vendor, may render the negligent party
also liable for another's publication. That inquiry is dealt with herein, at
footnotes 135-153, with accompanying text. Equally distinct, in the third
place, is the bearing of negligent conduct as constituting abuse of privilego
to publish defamation on an otherwise privileged occasion. That inquiry is
not dealt with herein. For some reference thereto in this connection seo
Vold, Defamation by Radio, (1932) 2 J. Radio L. 673, 705.
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at the microphone, does not publish at all but merely supplies the
broadcasting facilities to the speaker.8 It is either contended or
assumed accordingly that as the radio broadcaster never himself
publishes, the broadcaster should not be subject to the law of
defamation at all, but should be subjected to liability merely on
the basis of negligence in permitting the speaker to publish by using
his facilities. 9
The actual fact is that transmission by radio of intelligible and
continuously audible speech is not a purely automatic reaction of
the electrically charged apparatus to the words of the speaker as
uttered into the microphone. Effective broadcasting requires not
only utterance by the speaker but much conscious assistance from
the broadcaster, especially in reshaping of vocal sounds by the
operations of the broadcaster in such appropriate adjustments of
the modulation while the speech proceeds as to render the sounds
transmitted intelligibly and continuously audible to the far-flung
radio audience. The broadcaster thus actively participates with
the speaker in bringing about the transmission by radio that occurs.
The details of active participation by the broadcaster in the
gThis position was deliberately asserted by counsel for the broadcasting
station in the case of Sorensen v. Wood, (1932) 123 Neb. 348, 243 N. W. 82.
Typical excerpts from the argument to the jury and from the brief on that
appeal are the following: "Wre didn't do any talking, we didn't do any
writing. What we did was to furnish the facilities by which these words
were broadcast." (Bill of Exceptions, p. 48.) "This case did not show any
right on the part of Sorensen to hold the defendant broadcasting station for
the act of Wood." "In other words, plaintiff says defendant [station] was
at fault in not acting to prevent W,¥ood from defaming Sorensen." "He sues
Wood for slander, and in the same action sues the station for negligence in
failing to keep Wood from slandering plaintiff." (Defendant station's brief
on the first appeal, pp. 17, 19 and 33.)
9
This erroneous assumption regarding the facts of publication by radio
transmission seems to underlie the comments found in the following notes
on the case of Sorensen v. WArood: (1932) 46 Harv. L. Rev. 133, 135. 136,
137, 138; (1932) 18 Iowa L Rev. 98; (1932) 18 Corn. L. Q. 124; (1932)
66 U. S. L. Rev. 637, 642; (1933) 12 Oreg. L. Rev. 149, 153.
The same erroneous fact assumption seems to underlie the comment on
Miles v. Wasmer, Inc., (1933) 172 Wash. 466, 20 P. (2d) 847 appearing in
(1934) 7 So. Cal. L. Rev. 346, 348.
The same erroneous fact assumption seems to underlie the elaborate
criticism of the case of Sorensen v. Wood by Mr. John \W. Guider, Chairman
of the American Bar Association's Standing Committee on Communications.
contained in his article on Liability for Defamation in Political Broadcasts.
(1932) 2 J. Radio L. 708. In that article the author urges (p. 712) "a rule
which will release a broadcasting station from liability for defamatory
remarks made by others," etc., where due care has been used by the station.
Similar looseness of statement regarding the case of Sorensen v. Wood.
(1932) 123 Neb. 348, 243 N. W,.82, appears in the report of the Standing
Committee on Communications, (1932) 57 A. B. A. Rep. 446. The same
is true of Caldwell, Freedom of Speech and Radio Broadcasting, (1935) 177
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1, at p. 6.
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transmission of utterances by radio may be found partly in acts
of the announcer in adjusting the speaker's position with reference
to the microphone and otherwise assisting him regarding the proper
manner of delivery in order to render the broadcast of the best
technical quality.1 0 The announcer may also listen in on a receiver in the control room attached to the studio in order to test
the quality and tone of the broadcast and to make such adjustments with reference thereto as are within his competence."
Where the studio is located downtown and connected by wire with
the main station, additional operators at the main station where
the broadcast is "put on the air" may also take part, checking the
quality of the broadcast and making such adjustments as at the
main station appear to be needed from moment to moment in
order to assure satisfactory and wide range broadcasting.'2 It is
also to be noticed that switches are provided at the microphone, at
the apparatus in the control room, and at the apparatus in the
main station, which at all times enable the station operators to
shut off the broadcast if for any reason it is deemed obnoxious.' s
Much more significant, however, than the assistance rendered
to the speaker at the microphone by the announcer or other operators is the current participation in the broadcast by the radio station's monitor in the control room while the speech proceeds in
the studio. While this monitor may as one of his incidental duties
turn a switch and thereby shut off the broadcast14 if found to be
obnoxious, the monitor's principal participation while the speech
proceeds takes a much more active and significant form. By his
continuing appropriate readjustments 5 of the modulation' ° with
1OTestimony of defendant radio station's announcer, preserved in bill of
exceptions in Sorensen v. Wood, (1932) 123 Neb. 348, 243 N. W. 82.
"iBill of exceptions, at pp. 64-65.
12Bill of exceptions, at p. 70.
13Bill of exceptions, at p. 70.
14Bill of exceptions, at p. 70.
15 "The gentleman in the control booth controls the volume of the broadcast." Testimony of radio station's announcer, preserved in bill of exceptions.
at p. 62.
"The process of broadcasting as actually carried on in the instance was
not purely mechanical. It included the services of the broadcasting company's
announcer.... It included, in addition, the customary operations of the broadcasting company's monitor in adjusting and controlling the extent or volume
of modulation in the broadcast through the interval of time while the speech
proceeded." Stipulation filed in the case of Sorensen v. Wood, (1932) 123
Neb. 348, 243 N. W. 82, on the second appeal. See no. 28749, unreported.
"There are today in the United States over 600 broadcasting stations.
...In general, they all require the same essential pieces of apparatus which
may be classified as below: (a) The studio, microphone and speech amplifier;
(b) The radio-frequency system including oscillators and modulators; (c)
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reference to the varying character of the speaker's voice as the
speech proceeds the monitor so corrects and reshapes the vocal
sounds uttered by the speaker into the microphone that the resulting transmission can be picked up near and far by receiving sets
in the form of intelligible and continuously audible speech.',
The power equipment; (d)The control equipment." Morecroft, Principles
of Radio Communication, 3rd ed., p. 846.
"This [the volume control] is an extremely important feature in broadcasting as it is in general necessary for the operator to decrease tie range
of intensity impressed on the microphone. The pianissimo and fortissimo
passages of a selection are equalized to a certain extent by the radio operator." Morecroft, Principles of Radio Communication, 3rd ed., p. 847.
"Commercial transmitting equipment is ordinarily mounted on a framework of structural-steel members fronted by a vertical metal panel containing
the controls and meters necessary for adjusting and monitoring the transmitter." Terman, Radio Engineering 421.
"At the studio control room, the volume indicator measures the level in
T U [telephonic transmission units] delivered to the line; and at the station,
it measures the level delivered to the transmitter. These units give visual
indication of the signal level and allow the operators to adjust the 'gains'
of the amplifiers to the desired amount." Little, Speech Input Equipment, as
reported in (1929) 17 Proceedings of the Institute of Radio Engineers,
1986, 1995.
16"Modulation-the method of impressing a sound wave upon a radio
frequency carrier wave at the transmitting station." Moyer & Wostrel,
The Radio Handbook 38.
"In radio communication 'modulation' is the process of producing variations of a required form in the amplitude of the wave which is radiated."
Moyer & Wostrel, The Radio Handbook 451.
"The current before modulation is called the carrier current because it
is the medium which transmits the variations of the sound wave in the form
of current. The current after modulation is considered to consist of two
parts: (1) the carrier current and (2) the modulating current. The ability
of the carrier to transmit the modulation depends on the amplitude of the
modulating current compared to that of the carrier current." Moyer &
Wostrel,
The Radio Handbook 481.
1
7"The two following paragraphs set forth with substantial accuracy a
brief description of the customary operations of such monitor and the effects
achieved thereby in the process of broadcasting of utterances spoken into the
broadcasting company's microphone:
"'In order adequately to appreciate the station monitor's active participation in the making of a radio broadcast, it is needful to call to mind a
few more technical facts involved in the radio broadcasting process. It is
well known that in radio broadcasting what is called a radio carrier wave of
a certain frequency or wave length often loosely called an ether wave, is
developed by the action of a generator at the station. On the edges of this
radio carrier wave from the station's generator there is impressed in the
broadcasting process certain wave variations corresponding to the sound
waves transmitted from the microphone. Impressing the sound wave variations on the edges of this radio carrier wave is called modulation. The depth
to which the sound wave variations are impressed upon the edges of the radio
carrier wave is called the extent or volume of modulation. The volume of
modulation that automatically takes place when the sound wave is impressed
upon the radio carrier vave under given fixed conditions of the radio apparatus varies greatly with the variations in position, voice and manner of
utterance which may be employed from moment to moment by the speaker
at the microphone. The constantly varying position of the modulation indicator needle attached to the monitoring apparatus is readily apparent to any

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

Through the process of modulation readjustment currently performed by the radio station's monitor as the speech proceeds appropriate portions of the sounds uttered into the microphone are
reduced or eliminated while others may be accentuated 18 This
observer in the control booth as the broadcast proceeds. It is also clear that
the distance range covered by the broadcast from moment to moment largely
depends upon the volume of modulation.
"'To secure satisfactory and uniform wide range broadcasting, therefore,
apparatus to regulate the volume of modulation has been provided, and such
apparatus includes as one of its parts a so-called monitoring device. The
monitor, an operator in the control room quite distinct from the announcer,
conwatches the broadcast as reproduced there and carefully observes tile
tinual variations in position of the modulation indicator needle in order to
make from moment to moment such adjustment of the modulation as is
microphone.
required by the varying character of the speaker's voice at tile
Under present conditions in the art of broadcasting the regular practice is
for a monitor in the control booth to attend carefully to tile quality of the
broadcast as it is reproduced there, even if need be to the extent of keeping
his hands continuously on the regulating controls of the monitoring device,
and to make from moment to moment any needed adjustments of the volume
of modulation to secure so far as possible the technically most effective and
uniformly wide range broadcasting'."
Stipulation filed in the case of
Sorensen v. Wood, (1932) 123 Neb. 348, 243 N. W. 82, on the second appeal.
See 1no.
28749, unreported.
8
"While this [volume control] might be thought to distort the true
character of a rendition the actual result in the receiving set is more pleasing than if the practice were not resorted to. The power range of an orchestral selection may frequently be 100,000 to 1 and the ear of the listener
in the concert hall changes its sensitiveness automatically as these intensities
occur. In the radio amplifier such power ranges would result in unsatisfactory operation, tending to 'block' some of the tubes or give so little intensity to the low passages that the radio listener gets nothing. It has been
found that a power range of 1,000 to 1 is plenty to give a radio reproduction reasonable similarity to the actual rendition and this is about the range
used in practice.
a radio
"Furthermore, there is always a certain 'background' of noise ini
channel due to atmospherics, etc., and the low passages must be kept louder
than this background of noise. An operator constantly keeps watch on the
amplifier output and by manipulating the controls . . . he keeps the
Morecroft, Principles of Radio
amplification within the proper range."
Communication, 3rd ed., pp. 848-849.
"In the transmission of speech and music of high quality, sideband
components extending at least 5,000 cycles on each side of the carrier
frequency must be employed. Such a band provides for the transmission of
audio-frequency sounds having pitches up to 5,000 cycles, and while the
human voice and music contain frequencies up to approximately 15,000 cycles
these higher pitch sounds are not absolutely essential for reasonably satisfactory results. Understandable speech requires tilereproduction of all
frequencies from about 250 to 2,700 cycles, or side-band frequencies ranging
from 250 to 2,700 cycles above and below the carrier frequency." Terman,
Radio Engineering 359-360.
"In radio-telephone transmitters the character of the signals being sent
is checked by rectifying a small part of the energy delivered to the radiating
system. . . . All modern broadcast transmitters include a monitoring
rectifier as part of the transmitter equipment. . . . In operating radio-telephone transmitters it is necessary to maintain continuous observation of the
power level of the speech input to the audio system. The volume should
be adjusted so that the audio power is sufficient to modulate the transmitter
completely during the loud passages." Terman, Radio Engineering 450-451.
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selection and reshaping of the sounds through the processes of
modulation readjustment as the speech proceeds is carried out in
order that intelligibly audible and continuous reception may be
interrupted neither by false and blurring sounds set up in the transmitting process 9 nor by broken gaps in the effective transmission.20 Without these continuing, deliberate, conscious and voluntarily controlled operations of modulation readjustment as the
speech proceeds, the speaker's words, through the mere fixed conditions of the radio apparatus, would be so mutilated in transmission as to be for practical purposes unintelligible. 1 Only in the
form of disjointed broken fragments would the speaker's words
be recognizably audible even to nearby radio listeners. The farflung audience of radio listeners at more distant points would
not hear the utterances at all 2 2 Thus in present conditions of radio
19 "Fig. 33 shows three kinds of distortion occurring in modulation. Case
A has greater increases in radio frequency amplitude than decreases, and
Case B has the opposite condition; both of these conditions will cause the
receiver to pick up audio tones which were not in the original modulation.
If the original modulation frequency was 100 cycles the listener will hear
not only this frequency, but also a large component of 200-cycle frequency,
as well as a series of others.
Case C represents over-modulation; the signal received from such a
station wiU be unusually loud, but of disagreeable quality. Many notes and
tones will be heard by the listener which were not in the sound in the studio
of the transmitting station." Morecroft, Principles of Radio Communication,203rd ed., p. 811.
"The function of the control operators, whether in the field or at the
studio, is partly co-ordinative, as in connection with interstudio contact and
switching, and partly regulative, in that it is found necessary to compress
the natural volume variations of speech and music which may be as high
in some cases as 60 T U [Telephonic transmission units] into a compass
of about 40 T U, if overloading is to be avoided on the one hand and noise
interference on the other.... The rule is for the operator to handle the gain
control as little as possible, but to regulate it when necessary to avoid
overloading or the loss of low passages ..
" Dreher, Broadcast Control
Operations, as reported in (1928) 16 Proceedings of the Institute of Radio
Engineers 490, 508. See also footnote 18 above.
2""It is evidently important for a station operator to know to what
extent his carrier wave is being modulated; some performers talk loudly,
close to the microphone, and others talk softly farther away. The microphone response might well be one hundred times as great for the first as for
the second, so that one would cause much overmodulation or the other
would be much undermodulated." Morecroft, Principles of Radio Communication, 3rd ed., p. 810.
"The degree of modulation of the carrier in a radio telephone transmitter is a somewhat intangible factor which necessarily varies rapidly
through wide limits during the rendition of a program." Nelson, Broadcasting Transmitters and Related Transmission Phenomena, as reported in
(1929) 17 Proceedings of the Institute of Radio Engineers 1949, 1951.
2"By allowing for complete modulation an effective means is introduced for increasing the range." Moyer & Wostrel, The Radio Handbook
501.
"Increased modulation is particularly advantageous under present day
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broadcasting it is only by the combination of the voluntarily controlled, deliberate and continuing efforts of both speaker and
broadcaster, each doing his part in conjunction with the other
as the speech proceeds, that the utterances delivered into the microphone can be effectively transmitted.23
The continuous joint participation of both the speaker and the
radio station's monitor in the acts of publication by radio broadcasting has no direct parallel in other forms of publication now
familiar. It is therefore impossible to find in other forms of publication any complete and perfect analogy as to the facts involved
in the physical operations of broadcasting. "4 To state that the
broadcaster merely furnishes to the speaker facilities in the form
of amplifying machinery for his use, comparable to supplying a
printing press 23 or a megaphone

6

for another's use conveys a

broadcasting conditions, since it affords a means of almost doubling the
range of a given station without a corresponding increase in the beat note
Moyer & Wostrel, The Radio Handbook 506.
interference."
23
"The oscelloscope provided with this transmitter is an almost indispensable instrument in obtaining the full benefit of high modulation.
. . . By means of this device the peak and average modulation can be accurately gauged at all times and a high average level maintained from minute
to minute with no danger of peak distortion." Duncan & Drew, Radio
Telegraphy & Telephony 897-898.
"In the usual radio transmission there are two parties, the speaker and
the broadcaster. If the matter transmitted be defamatory, two must cooperate to create the harm. No other situation parallels it. The utterance
of the speaker does not leave the studio until transmitted by the operations
of the station owner. They must act in concert to complete the publication." Davis, The Law of Radio Communication 162.
"The publication of a libel by radio to listeners over the air requires
the participation of both the speaker and the owner of the broadcasting
station. The publication to such listeners is not completed until the material is broadcasted." Goss, C. J., in Sorensen v. Wood, (1932) 123 Neb.
348, 357, 243 N. W. 82, 86.
"The conclusion seems inescapable that the owner of the station is liable.
It is he who broadcasted the defamation. . . . Here the instrumentality is
operated by the owner for another who has hired him to operate it." Otis,
District Judge, in Coffey v. Midland Broadcasting Co., (1934) 8 F. Supp.
889, 24
890.
"No other situation parallels it." Davis, The Law of Radio Communication 162.
25
"Suppose you own a printing press and somebody rents it from you
and that man takes the printing press and prints a lot of defamatory and
scandalous stuff, do you think that he [you] should be held when he [you!
didn't know what he was going to print, when he [you] had no word of
warning of this thing?" From defendant station's argument to the jury
in Sorensen v. Wood, (1932) 123 Neb. 348, 243 N. W. 82, bill of exceptions 250.
26"If the owner of a megaphone permits some person to use it for the
purpose of so increasing the sound of the voice that a speech may be made
to a large audience, can it be said that the owner of the megaphone in the
absence of negligence or collusion is absolutely liable for defamatory
statements made during the speech? If the owner of an auditorium rents
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grossly erroneous impression of the facts involved. The broadcaster supplies to the speaker not only the mechanical facilities
but also the necessary services in operating the broadcasting apparatus to reshape the spoken sounds to such form in transmission
as to render them intelligibly and continuously audible to the farflung public of radio listeners. In terms of the printing press
analogy, it is rather as if the broadcaster not only supplies the
press but also furnishes the service necessary to its operation by
setting in type, printing and mailing out the defamatory utterances
in question. That the broadcaster's operations in publication by
radio bring about instantaneous transmission does not make that
transmission of the utterance any the less a publication thereof
than in other cases where the transmission may occupy a longer
interval of time.
The fact of the joint participation of the speaker and the broadcasting station's monitor, but not of course the legal basis for
liability, is somewhat loosely comparable to the joint activity of
two parties'in driving an automobile if one handled the steering
wheel while the other manipulated the clutch and the brakes and
operated the accelerator controlling the variable supply of gasoline
currently necessary for maintaining a reasonably uniform speed
over an uneven roadbed. Again, with reference to the voluntary
operations of the broadcasting station's monitor, the joint participation of speaker and broadcaster may be somewhat loosely compared to the acts of pitcher and batter in a baseball game. 'he
pitcher pitches the ball; the batter bats the pitched ball, by his
operations propelling it to the place where it hits the ground or is
intercepted by others. The batter's stroke, far from being a purely
automatic operation, is delivered with specific reference to the
character of the pitched ball in the instance encountered.2-2. Operations of the Broadcaster Constitute Publication of
the.Speaker's Utterances.--It is well settled that a voluntary parit for purpose of holding a political meeting, is he liable for defamatory
matter spoken at the meeting?" From appellant station's brief, p. 14 on

the second appeal in Sorensen v. Wood, (1932) 123 Neb. 348, 243 N. W.
82 to2 7the supreme court of Nebraska, No. 28749 (May, 1933) (unreported).
1t cannot safely be assumed that in the first instance either juries or

courts will be minutely familiar with the detailed scientific processes involved in the operations of radio broadcasting. It would therefore seem

tactically very important for injured plaintiffs in cases of defamation by

radio to prove by convincing evidence in the record the vital facts regarding
both the presence and the significance of the active and continuous voluntary
operations of the radio station's monitor from moment to moment in reshap-

ing the sounds for efficiency in radio transmission as the speech proceeded.
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ticipator with another in the acts of publication of defamatory
utterances is as a general rule under the law of defamation liable
2

as publisher.

8

The position that voluntary transmission of defamatory utterances to the understanding of the recipient (such recipient being
another than the party defamed) is enough to constitute publication as tested by the already established law of defamation is also
readily demonstrated by a few very simple observations on the
available authorities.
In the first place, the authorities are clear that without voluntary transmission by the defendant to the understanding of the
recipient there is no publication by the defendant. Thus the mere
projection of sensory impressions on the recipient's eye or car
drum without communicating the defamatory utterances to the
recipient's understanding does not constitute publication.
Sinilarly, where defamatory utterances have in the instance been communicated to recipients by the acts of others but their transmission was not made by the defendant, the authorities hold that the
defendant is not the publisher of such utterances,3 0 even though
he may have been their author.
In the second place, the authorities are equally clear that where
28

Miller v. Butler, (1850) 6 Cush. (Mass.) 71, 52 Am. Dec. 768;
Peterson v. Western Union Tel. Co., (1896) 65 Minn. 18, 67 N. W. 646;
Schmuck v. Hill, (1901) 2 Neb. (unof.) 76, 96 N. W. 158; Hedgpeth v.
Coleman, (1922) 183 N. C. 309, 111 S. E. 517, 24 A. L. R. 232; Snyder v.
Andrews, (1849) 6 Barb. (N.Y.) 43; Weston v. Weston, (1903) 83 App.
Div. 520, 82 N. Y. S. 351; Willis v. Hardcastle, (1902) 19 Pa. Super. Ct.
525; Belo v. Fuller, (1892) 84 Tex. 450, 19 S. W. 616; Newell, Libel and
Slander,
4th ed., p. 233; Cooley, Torts, Throckmorton's ed., p. 321.
29
For cases of utterances in a foreign language, not understood by
surrounding listeners, see Price v. Jenkings, (1601) Cro. Eliz. 865;
Economopoulos v. Pollard Co., (1914) 218 Mass. 294, 105 N. F. 896.
For a case where the sound of voices was heard but the words were
not distinguished or understood, see Giveen v. Matthews, (1929) 118 Neb.
125, 30
223 N. W. 649.
Weir v. Hoss, (1884) 6 Ala. 887 (publication by thief of a defamatory writing does not constitute publication by its author) ; Olson v. Molland, (1930) 181 Minn. 364, 232 N. W. 625 (addressee of defamatory letter
placed it in desk drawer after reading it. Stranger later opened the drawer
and read it. Held writer did not publish to the stranger); Bigley v.
National Fidelity and Casualty Co., (1913) 94 Neb. 813, 144 N. W. 810
(writer of defamatory letter not accountable for subsequent publication
thereof to others by addressee where not induced by him) ; Riley v. Askia
& Marine Co., (1926) 134 S. C. 198, 132 S. E. 584, 46 A. L. R. 558 (writer
of defamatory letter addressed to young woman of 17 or 18 years of age,
having no reason to believe it would be opened by others, not accountable
as publisher when it was opened and read by the girl's parents).
For discussion of the problem of negligent participation in publication
made by others, see footnotes 135-153 below, with accompanying text.
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a defendant voluntarily does transmit defamatory utterances to
the understanding of recipients there is publication by the transmitter. Authorship by the transmitter is not required to constitute
publication. Voluntary transmission alone by the defendant of
another's speech or writing is enough."' So, in the absence of
privilege, the repeater is liable for his own repetition to others of
defamatory statements previously published to him by the original
author, even though he evowedly merely repeats the statements
of another.32
In the third place, what particular acts are used as the means
for transmission of defamatory utterances is immaterial. Cases
of spoken or written language are too familiar to need elaborate
citation in this connection. Transmission by means of intended
or expected combination of the defendant's acts with the acts ol
others in enabling the utterances to reach the minds of recipients
is matter of constant occurrence. In addition to spoken and written language, various items of conduct, 33 conveying the defamatory impressions to the recipient's understanding, have also from
time to time been held to render the defendant resorting to them
liable as publisher.
In the fourth place, understanding by the voluntary transmitter of the meaning reasonably understood by recipients is under
the available authorities not necessary in order to establish the
transmitter's liability as publisher in cases of defamation. Thus,
it is abundantly established that utterances are transmitted at the
peril of the voluntary transmitter with respect to the defamatory
meaning reasonably understood therefrom by recipients. ' It is
31
Forrester v. Tyrrell, (1893) 9 T. L. R. 257, 57 J. P. 532 (reading
aloud to third parties another's defamatory letter) ; Hird v. Wood, (1894)
38 Sol. J. 234 (pointing at a defamatory placard, thereby attracting attention 32
of passersby to its contents is publication).
McPherson v. Daniels, (1829) 10 B. & C. 263, 8 L. J. 0. S. K. B. 14;
Barr v. Birkner, (1895) 44 Neb. 197, 62 N. W. 494; Oklahoma Pub. Co. v.
Givens,
33 (C.C.A. 10th Cir. 1933) 67 F. (2d) 62.
Peck v. Tribune Co., (1909) 214 U. S. 185, 29 Sup. Ct. 554, 53 L Ed.
960 (picture) ; Schultz v. Frankfort Marine Accident & Plate Glass Ins. Co.,
(1913) 151 Wis. 537, 139 N. W. 386 (notorious shadowing) ; Merle v. Sociological Research Film Corporation, (1915) 166 App. Div. 376, 152 N. Y. S.
829 (moving picture) ; Hird v. Wood, (1894) 38 Sol. J. 234 (pointing at
placard); Varner v. Morton, (1919) 52 N. S. (Can.) 180 (Charivari);
Monson v. Tussaud, [1894] 1 Q. B. 671, 692, 63 L. J. Q. B. 454 (Effigy) ;
Brewer v. Dew, (1843) 11 M. & W. 625, 12 L. J. -x. 448 (seizing goods
on an unfounded claim of debt) ; Peterson v. Western Union, (1898) 72
finn. 41, 74 N. W. 1022, 40 L. R. A. 661 (telegraphic transmission, reduced
to writing
by receiving operator).
34
Hanklnson v. Bilby, (1847) 16 ,f. & W. 442, 2 Car. & Kir. 440; Morrison v. Ritchie & Co., (1902) 4 F. (Scot.) 1016, 39 Sc. L. R. 432; Cassidy
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equally well established that utterances are transmitted at the peril
of the voluntary transmitter with respect to the person who is
reasonably understood by recipients to be referred to therein."t As
the actual decisions on the law of defamation now stand, there fore,
questions of due care in connection with acts of publication are
immaterial on the question of liability under the law of
defamation. 6
v. Daily Mirror Newspapers, [1929] 2 K. B. 331, 98 L. J. K. B. 595; Peck
v. Tribune Co.. (1909) 214 U. S. 185, 29 Sup. Ct. 554, 53 L. Ed. 960; Washington Post Co. v. Chaloner, (1919) 250 ,U. S. 290, 39 Sup. Ct. 448, 63
L. Ed.
987; Bar v. Birkner, (1895) 44 Neb. 197, 62 N. W. 494.
35
Taylor v. Hearst, (1895) 107 Cal. 262, 40 Pac. 392, (1897) 118 Cal.
366, 50 Pac. 54; E. Hulton & Co. v. Jones, [ 1910] A. C. 20, 79 L. J. K. B.
198; Walker v. Bee-News Publishing Co., (1932) 122 Neb. 511, 240 N. W.
579; Washington Post Co. v. Kennedy, (1925) 55 App. D. C. 162, 3 F. (2d)
207, 41 A. L. R. 483.
3
6For authorities, see footnotes 34 and 35 above. The problem on tile
merits is carefully analyzed, with a wealth of supporting authority in Smith,
Jones v. Hulton, (1912) 60 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 365, 461. See also Harper,
Torts, sec. 237.
For the sake of completeness it seems desirable here to mention two
special arguments that sometimes have been urged to avoid tile conclusion
that with respect to the defamatory meaning reasonably understood by recipients the publication is at the publisher's own risk.
The first of these arguments is built upon the literal meaning of the
word "malice." Briefly stated, this argument asserts that malice is the gist
of the action, and that to publish maliciously the publisher must have knowledge of the defamatory meaning. Obviously this argument misuses the term
"malice." As a requisite for the existence of a cause of action for defamation
the term "malice" in its literal sense has long since become immaterial, a
result often expressed in the fictitious form that its presence is conclusively
presumed whenever there is publication of defamatory utterances without
legal justification. The materiality of "malice" in its literal sense is now
limited to cases of exemplary damages and to cases of abuse of privilege.
See Bromage v. Prosser, (1825) 4 B. & C. 247, 3 L. J. 0. S. K. B. 203;
Coleman v. MacLennan, (1908) 78 Kans. 711, 98 Pac. 281, 20 L. R. A.
(N.S.) 361. This feature is explained in detail on historical grounds in
Smith, Jones v. Hulton, (1912) 60 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 365, 370-373. See also
Veeder, The History and Theory of the Law of Defamation, (1904) 4
Colum. L. Rev. 33, 35-36; 8 Holdsworth, History of English Law 371-375.
The second argument occasionally advanced to avoid the conclusion
that the reasonably understood meaning of defamatory utterances is at the
publisher's risk is an argument of an entirely different nature. Certain speculative contentions have in some quarters been advanced in recent years which
in this regard seek an interpretation of the legal materials limiting the
transmitter's liability to cases involving guilty knowledge or negligent conduct. Such speculation would, in effect, re-interpret the legal materials in
the field of defamation in order to bring the law of defamation into accord
with the law of negligence. See case notes in (1910) 22 Jurid. Rev. 254,
259; (1916) 29 Harv. L. Rev. 533; (1925) 38 Harv. L. Rev. 1100; (1929
17 Calif. L. Rev. 684. These attempts at reinterpretation of the legal materials make much of the discredited cases of Smith v. Ashley, (1846) 52
Mass. 367 and Hanson v. Globe Newspaper Co., (1893) 159 Mass. 293, 20
L. R. A. 856 and seek to explain away the well established course of adjudication to the contrary found in the type of cases cited in footnotes 34 and
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Taking the physical facts of radio broadcasting operations just
as they are, and taking the already established law of defamation
just as it is, therefore, the conclusion is very clear that the radio
broadcaster as well as the speaker at the microphone is a publisher
of the utterances broadcast. The broadcaster is not an author, but
authorship is not necessary. By the current operations of modulation readjustment as the speech proceeds the broadcaster so selects
and reshapes the sounds uttered into the microphone as to render
the sounds transmitted intelligibly and continuously audible to
the far-flung radio audience. By his operations the radio broadcaster is thus an active transmitter of the speaker's utterances to
37
the understanding of radio listeners.
That radio transmission is accomplished through novel means
not formerly familiar should not affect the question of the transmitter's responsibility as publisher. What particular means are
resorted to for transmission is immaterial on the question of the
publisher's liability for defamation. 36 Radio broadcasting as the
means of transmission is in fact deliberately sought and the advertising rates therefor paid as a commercial matter because of its
superior effectiveness for various occasions in conveying to the
understanding of radio listeners the statements thus transmitted.30
For the reaping of income from these rates commercial broadcasting stations are operated.4 0 The fact that the commercial broad35 above with the assertion that in many of such cases the result might
have been rested on the ground of some element of negligence asserted to
have been present in the facts involved. It may be added as a remark on the
merits that such speculation seems wholly fallacious. Judged by the expressions used by its authors in its promulgation, such speculation is based on
the unexamined assumption that justice requires that there should be no.
tort liability in the absence of intentional wrongdoing or negligent conduct.
Such speculation so based can be no more convincing than its unexamined
underlying assumption upon which it is erected. That such assumption itself
is utterly erroneous is set forth in considerable detail in another portion of
the present paper. See footnotes 43-57 below, with accompanying text.
37
See footnotes 15 to 23 above, with accompanying text.
3
8See footnote 33 above, with accompanying text.
39
See footnote 1 above for data regarding the rapid growth of the broadcasting industry, constituting the most cogent practical indication of its
greatly superior effectiveness within its own business range as compared
with its commercial competitors.
40
"The only manner in which this station can continue to furnish entertainment-to the public without cost to the listener is by selling a part of its
time on the air to people desiring to advertise themselves or their goods."
(From defendant station's exhibit 6, Bill of Exceptions, at p. 97, in record
of Sorensen v. Wood, (1932) 123 Neb. 348, 143 N. W. 82.
"The question affects every radio owner in the United States as well
as radio broadcasters, because the revenue derived from political broadcasts
is one of the means which enables broadcasters to continue furnishing radio
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caster has adopted the novel but most effective means for accomplishing the transmission service which he renders is by itself no
reason for relieving that commercial transmitter from the ordinary
liability for defamation that would be applicable as a matter of
course had the older and more familiar but less effective means
for transmission been in the instance employed.
That the broadcaster in the instance may pay no particular
attention to the meaning of the utterances involved but intentionally transmits to the listening radio public whatever the payiiig
speaker may happen to utter into the microphone equally can
afford no basis for relieving the transmitter's responsibility as
publisher. Good faith, due care, or honest mistake here afford no
excuse. Under the law of defamation publication of utterances
reasonably conveying to recipients a defamatory meaning is at

4
the risk of the publisher, not at the risk of the victim. '

In the absence of some independent controlling reason for
applying a more lenient rule to the broadcaster, therefore, both the
speaker and the broadcaster as active participants in the publication of defamatory utterances are under the law of defamation
equally liable as publishers.

42

3. The Assertion that Negligence is the General Rule of Tort
Liability-Requirements of Justice.-The most adroit as well as
the most frequently encountered argument for the desired change
entertainment." (From appellant station's Statement as to Jurisdiction, p.
6, in KFAB Broadcasting Company v. Sorensen, (1933) 290 U. S. 599, 54
Sup. Ct. 209, 78 L. Ed. 526.)
4"See footnotes 34 and 35 above, with accompanying text.
42
The foregoing discussion has been designed to demonstrate that in
the present state of the art of broadcasting the broadcaster's voluntary operations of radio transmission constitute the broadcaster an active publisher
of the utterances delivered by the speaker into the microphone.
It should not be supposed, however, that were radio transmission of the
speaker's utterances a purely automatic process the broadcaster could in
that case avoid strict accountability therefor. It is conceivable that invention
of improvements in radio apparatus may some day provide automatic corrective readjustments of the modulation as the speech proceeds, thereby
dispensing with the active services of the radio station's monitor in that
connection. Under such facts, the direct application of the law of defamation
would not be so clear. Under such facts, however, the constantly increasing
array of analogies from the field of strict liability, indicated in footnotes 44
to 52 below, with accompanying text, would be available as persuasive
authority for application to the broadcasting station. The courts would
face the necessity of making some choice of alternatives among the available authorities for controlling application to the novel situation. Under
such facts the same considerations of public policy indicated in footnotes
44 to 82 below, with accompanying text, would call for the application of
the law of strict liability rather than of negligence, as the measure of the
broadcaster's responsibility.
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from defamation to negligence as the basis for the radio broadcaster's liability seems to be the mere unsupported assumption that
the law of negligence is the general rule of tort liability, coupled
with the equally unsupported conclusion rested thereon that accordingly justice requires the application of that rule to the business
of radio broadcasting as it is applied to every other legitimate
43
business.

The assumptions, however, on which these adroit arguments
are based are wholly fallacious. It manifestly is not the case, in
the first place, that the law of negligence is the general rule of tort
liability. The law of torts covers a vast field of injurious interference with the interests of others. In different portions of the
vast field comprehended in the law of torts the bases of liability
often differ from negligence. Negligence is a portion, but only a
portion, of the law of torts. In large portions of the law of torts,
such as assault, battery, imprisonment, trespass to realty and trespass to personalty, the actual interference is intentional. In these
familiar matters it is too clear to need citation of authority that
the actor acts at his peril with respect to the existence of legal
justification for his conduct, even though proceeding under a supposed claim of right, reasonably relied upon. Likewise, the owner's
liability for trespassing or dangerous animals does not depend on
fault.4" A similar strict liability regardless of due care is imposed
43"To impose liability under such circumstances is to penalize in the
absence of blameworthiness-not the usual principle in the law of torts."
Davis, Law of Radio Communication 164.
"To impose a rule of absolute liability under such circumstances is
somewhat shocking. It might make the station owner subject to the payment of damages for an injury which he could not prevent and which
involves neither wrongdoing nor negligence on his part. It is an easy
answer to say that he need not broadcast and if he does he must suffer all
the consequences. But this is not the rule applied to the conduct of other
business no more legitimate, in which under the law of tort liability depends
upon fault. Justice seems to require the application of the due care doctrine."
Davis, Law of Radio Communication 168.
"The problem, novel in its application to the duties and liabilities of the
owners of a broadcasting station, is not fundamentally different from countless instances that may be found in the body of the law of torts ... release
a broadcasting station from liability . . . whenever it appears that the management of the station exercised due and reasonable care to avoid the utterance of defamation." Guider, Liability for Defamation in Political Broadcasts, (1932) 2 J. Radio L. 708, 712-713.
4
A leading case on trespassing cattle is Noyes v. Colby, (1855) 30
N. H. 143. See also, for special problems of application, Tillett v. Ward,
(1882) 10 Q. B. D. 17, 52 L. J. Q. B. 61 (driven animal trespassing at edge
of highway), and Delaney v. Erickson, (1880) 10 Neb. 492, (1881) 11 Neb.
533 (herding cattle on another's land in open range territory).
Leading cases on dangerous animals are: May v. Burdett, (1846)

9
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in nuisance cases,45 and in the expanding field of so-called extrahazardous undertakings." Of the same kind is the principal's
liability for the torts of his agents, 4 7 and, in the field of nondelegable duties, the employer's responsibility for the torts of independent contractors. 4" Again, statutory provisions abound requiring conduct falling within their range to be taken at the risk of
the actor wholly regardless of questions of due care on his part.4"
So, too, in the familiar field of libel and slander itself, publication
of unprivileged defamatory utterances is made at the risk of the
publisher, who cannot throw the risk of injury upon his passive
Q. B. 101, 16 L. 3. Q. B. 64 (monkey) ; Vrendenburg v. Behan, (1881) 33
La. Ann. 627 (bear) ; Baker v. Snell, [19081 2 K. B. 352, 825, 77 L. J. K. B.
1090 (savage dog).
45Ball v. Nye, (1868) 99 Mass. 582 (filth from the defendant's privy
percolating through the ground and polluting the plaintiff's well) ; Ferrea
v. Knipe, (1863) 28 Cal. 340 (backing up water in stream, thereby flooding
plaintiff's land); Kroecker v. Camden Coke Co., (1913) 82 N. J. Eq. 373,
88 AtI. 955 (smoke); Cumberland Grocery Co. v. Baugh, (1913) 151 Ky.
641, 152 S. W. 565 (stenches) ; McGill v. Pintsch Compressing Co., (1908)
140 Iowa
429, 118 N. W. 786, 20 L. R. A. (N.S.) 466 (noise).
4
6Fletcher v. Rylands, (1866) L. R. 1 Ex. 265; same case on appeal to
the House of Lords, (1868) L. R. 3 H. L. 330, 37 L. J. Ex. 161 (water
reservoir) ; Exner v. Sherman Power Const. Co., (C.C.A. 2nd Cir. 1931)
54 F. (2d) 510, 80 A. L. R. 686 (dynamite) ; Green v. General Petroleum
Corporation, (1928) 205 Cal. 328, 270 Pac. 952, 60 A. L. R. 475 (blowing
out of an oil well).
In Rochester G. & E. Co. v. Dunlop, (1933) 148 Misc. Rep. 849, 266
N. Y. S. 469, the operator of an airplane was held liable for damage to land
caused by his non-negligent crash. This position is also supported by the
American Law Institute, Restatement, Torts, sec. 159, comment g and sec.
165, illustration no. 8. To the same effect, see Thurston, Trespass to Air
Space, in Harvard Legal Essays, 501-536, and Bohlen, Aviation under the
Common Law, (1934) 48 Harv. L. Rev. 216-237.
47
"In accordance with the rules stated in sections 219-267, a master or
other principal may be liable to another whose interests have been invaded
by the tortious conduct of a servant or other agent, although the principal
does not personally violate a duty to such other nor authorize the conduct
of the agent causing the invasion." Restatement, Agency, sec. 216.
"What we have [in the principal's liability for agent's misconduct] is a
doctrine of liability without regard to fault imposed upon those who conduct
enterprises by employing others. At bottom the principle is the same as
that in the doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher-that one who maintains something which if not kept in hand may endanger the general security, must
keep it in hand at the risk of responding for resulting injuries if he does
not." Pound, Interpretations of Legal History 110.
4SThe leading case is Bower v. Peate, (1876) 1 Q. B. D. 321, 45
L. J. Q. B. 446. For a convenient relatively recent case see Hussey v. Long
Dock R. Co., (1924) 100 N. J. L. 380, 126 Atd. 314.
49Workmen's compensation acts are conspicuous illustrations with reference to the relations of master and servant. For a penetrating analysis and
discussion of the broader problem see Thayer, Public Wrong and Private
Actions, (1914) 27 Harv. L. Rev. 317.
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innocent victim by acting with due care. 50 In many large portions
of the law of torts it is thus very clear that conduct is in the
instance carried on at the risk of the actor and that accordingly
liability for injury done is based on other grounds than negligence. 5 The sweeping assumption that negligence is the general
rule of tort liability is therefore wholly fallacious.52
Equally fallacious is the assumption that justice requires the
application of the rule of negligence to the radio broadcasting
industry as it is applied to every other legitimate business.5 " Since
many other commercial undertakings, and notably publishing
enterprises, are not free from liability to injured parties for the
damage perpetrated through their operations even though they
had exercised due care, conceptions of equality before the law
do not demand that the radio industry be accorded milder treatment. Broadcasting companies as a class are outstanding financial and business giants5" as compared with many, of their com5

OSee footnotes 34 and 35 above.
51On liability for damage done without fault see Isaacs, Fault and Liability, (1918) 31 Harv. L. Rev. 954; Smith. Tort and Absolute Liability,
Suggested Changes in Classification, (1917) 30 Harv. L. Rev. 241, 319, 409;
Takayanagi, Liability Without Fault in the Modern Civil and Common Law,
(1921) 16 Ill.
L. Rev. 163, 268, (1922) 17 Ill.
L. Rev. 185, 416; Feezer,
Capacity to Bear Loss as a Factor in the Decision of Certain Types of
Tort Cases, (1930) 78 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 805; Harris, Liability Without
Fault,
52 (1932) 6 Tl. L. Rev. 337.
1n Green v. General Petroleum Corporation, (1928)
205 Cal. 328,
270 Pac. 952, 60 A. L. R. 475, the court said, "That an injury may exist
without liability under some circumstances is certain. But such rule is contrary to the general rule of liability," citing Sussex, etc., Co. v. Midwest
Refining Co., (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1923) 294 Fed. 597, 34 A. L R. 249.
"Today there is a strong and growing tendency to revive the idea of
liability without fault, not only in the form of wide responsibility for agencies
employed, but in placing upon an enterprise the burden of repairing injuries
without fault of him who conducts it, which are incident to the undertaking.
"There is a strong and growing tendency, where there is no blame on
either side, to ask, in view of the exigencies of social justice who can best
bear the loss, and hence to shift the loss by creating liability where there
is no fault." Pound, The End of Law, (1914) 27 Harv. L. Rev. 195, 233.
"In fact, legal fault upon which liability is based has little connection
with personal morality or with justice to the individual; it is always tinctured with a supposed expediency in shifting the loss from one harmed to
one who has caused the harm by acting below the standard imposed by the
courts or legislators. But even this emasculated form of fault, while very
important in the hierarchy of legal ideas, plays no part in many situations.
. . .Without considering the field of vicarious liability, therefore, it would
appear that after nearly a century and a half devoted to this philosophic
conception that there should be liability only if there is fault, the net result
has been only to make a modified form of it an inlay in the common law
idea that the price of action is liability for harm caused by it." Seavey, in
Harvard Legal Essays 442, 445. See also footnote 154 below.
5
5 3See for instance the passages cited in footnote 43 above.
USee data set forth in footnote 1 above.
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petitors for commercial or political advertising, small publishers
of books and newspapers to whom the law of defamation with its
strict liability for unprivileged defamatory utterances is applied
as a matter of course. Equality as a measure of justice requires
the application of the strict law of defamation to the strongest as
well as to the weakest of the commercial competitors in the business of publication. 55
Moreover, the innocent victim of the broadcaster's operations
would, by the suggested change, be left to bear the risk and suffer
the injury without redress though entirely passive throughout,
although nowise burdening or endangering the active publisher,
and although without even a possibility of gain from being thus
victimized.5 6 Yet it is the broadcaster's voluntary operations which
actively create the danger and cause the damage, in course of commercial operations carried on for his own profit. The broadcaster
is by comparison a relatively well organized, wealthy, and semimonopolistic perpetrator. He can best guard against the injurious
deed. He can best spread the loss involved when it occurs. He
can in any case readily protect himself as a practical matter by
requiring indemnification in advance from advertisers or by
arranging for insurance to cover.57 The suggested change would
shift the loss from such a perpetrator to the relatively poor and
weak victim who is entirely passive and entirely innocent and who
as a practical matter can do none of these things.
Whether viewed, therefore, from the standpoint of equality
before the law, protection to innocent victims, cause of the damage, profit from the operations involved, one-sidedness of the risks
concerned, ability to bear the loss, ability to prevent its perpetration, or ability to arrange for self protection through indemnity
or insurance, the same conclusion from the standpoint of justice
reappears. That conclusion is that radio broadcasting publishers
"5 "Such commercial advertising is strongly competitive with newspaper
advertising because it performs a similar office between those having wares
to advertise and those who are potential users of those wares. . . There
is no legal reason why one should be favored over another ..
" Goss, C. J.,
in Sorensen v. Wood, (1932) 123 Neb. 348, 243 N. W. 82, 86.
56
"From the viewpoint of the broadcasting station the situation teems
with dangerous possibilities." Guider, Liability for Defamation in Political
Broadcasts, (1932) 2 J. Radio L. 708, 712.
The writer here quoted uses the danger to the broadcasting station as
an argument for releasing the station from liability in the absence of negligence, without seeming to notice that the alternative urged merely leaves
the passive innocent victim of the broadcaster's operations exposed to the
identical
dangers without effective redress.
57
See footnote 74 below, with accompanying and following text.
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are not entitled to greater favors than other publishers, and that
no reason is apparent from the standpoint of justice why in their
interest innocent and helpless victims should be sacrificed.,
When
broadcasters and their passive innocent victims are regarded
together as parts of the single picture that is viewed, it seems little
less than presumptuous to claim in a court of justice that the risk
of "character assassination" created by the comnercial activity of
broadcasting stations ought, to the greater advantage of such stations, to be thrown on their passive and innocent victims.
4. Thw Assertion that Impossibility of Program Control Requires Application of the Negligence Ride.-Unsupported assertion has again been substituted for rational argument on the facts
as they really are in the contention that the broadcaster's inability
to control the utterances broadcast requires in its case the application of the negligence rule. It has been asserted that newspaperh
and other printers can in advance control the contents of the
"copy" to be published, through scrutiny of the copy before it is
set in type, and through proof reading, a control asserted to be
impossible in the case of broadcasting where utterance of the
speech into the microphone and its transmission to the listening
public are simultaneous. It has accordingly been asserted that
while the strict law of defamation may be properly applicable to
printers and newspapers, it is harsh and unfair to apply that rule
to radio stations, requiring them to do the impossible or to be
penalized in the absence of blameworthiness."
As a matter of fact there are no such decisive differences
between the physical facts involved in the operations of publication
by newspaper and by radio. To be sure, the newspaper by previous scrutiny of the copy, proof reading, and so forth, can exercise
such practical control as to avoid in most instances the publication
of defamatory matter. It is clear, however, that such control cannot be complete. Those in charge cannot have the skill of experts,
nor can they always know in what sense the published statements
will be reasonably understood by readers. Further, under the rushing pressure for time frequently encountered in going to press,
5
s"There is no legal reason why one should be favored over another nor
why a broadcasting station should be granted special favors as against one
who may be a victim of a libelous publication." Goss, C. J., in Sorensen v.
Wood,
(1932) 123 Neb. 348, 243 N. W. 82, 86.
59
This contention is set out at considerable length, but without a
shadow of support from judicial authority, in Davis, Law of Radio Conmunication 164, 168-169.
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it often happens that only the most casual editorial attention can
be given to various items of late copy that certain advertisers want
included. Even when using due care, therefore, the newspaper is
still subject to the risk, very real60 but usually not very great, of
answering for occasional defamatory matter.
In radio broadcasting the physical facts involved in publication, while differing in detail, are strikingly similar with regard to
opportunity to know and control the contents actually published.
Here, as in the case of the newspaper, a large measure of control
is exercised, but, as in the case of the newspaper, such control
cannot be complete. It is well recognized practice to require the
previous submission of the manuscript to be broadcast. 0' Frequently, too, the advertising programs are uttered into the microphone by talent in the employ of the broadcasting station.02 Such
deliberate deviations from instructions as may occasionally occur
on the part of outside advertising talent given access to the microphone are in practice easily dealt with by exclusion from future
programs. Practical program control must necessarily be maintained by the radio station in its ordinary advertising programs
in order to preserve the goodwill of its service with the public of
radio listeners.63 Both newspaper and radio broadcaster maintain
practical control of the contents published. Both are subject to
6
OLeading libel cases involving newspapers readily afford illustrations:
Barnes v. Campbell, (1879) 59 N. H. 128; Morse v. Times-Republican
Printing Co., (1904) 124 Iowa 707; Morrison v. Ritchie & Co., (1902) 4 F.
(Scot.) 1016, 39 Sc. L. R. 432; E. Hulton & Co. v. Jones, [19101 A. C. 20,
79 L. J. K. B. 198; Cassidy v. Daily Mirror Newspapers, [19291 2 K. 11.
331, 98 L. J. K. B. 595.
6
1Q. 968. "I will ask you if, when your deposition was taken, this question, being numbered 58 if you want to refer to it, was not asked of you:
'Well, you have frequently asked for the manuscript and received the manuscript before the speech was delivered haven't you?' and your answer was
'Yes' ?"
A. "You asked me so many questions it is rather hard to remember
them definitely."
Q. 969. "Refreshing your memory, I will ask you whether or not question 58 was asked and answered as therein stated?"
A. "Yes."
(From testimony in Sorensen v. Wood, (1932) 123 Neb. 348, 143 N. W.
82, Bill of Exceptions, pp. 201, 202.)
62
The ordinary practice followed by the radio station as described in
Miles v. Louis Wasmer, Inc., (1933) 172 Wash. 466, 20 P. (2d) 487, readily
serves as illustration.
63"I had always made an attempt to broadcast material over KlI-AB
that is the very best in the interest of the public and our listeners." (From
testimony in Sorensen v. Wood, Bill of Exceptions, p. 192.)
See also remarks on this feature in statement of Federal Radio Commission, quoted in footnote 121 below.
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the risk of occasional lapses which no care practically exercisable
can completely guard against.
Furthermore, even should it be assumed as a fact that complete
control involves greater difficulty in publication by radio than by
newspaper, the law of negligence should not on that account be
substituted for the law of defamation in order to relieve the commercial broadcaster from the usual liability. Radio broadcasting
as now developed constitutes the most powerful and the most
dangerous agency for defamation ever designed; for it is the most
rapid, the most intimate, and the most far-reaching instrumentality
of communication at present available. The danger to innocent
victims from such publication of defamatory utterances has been
many times multiplied. Greater difficulties of program control in
radio broadcasting, if actually involved, far from going to relieve
the broadcaster from the usual liability, rather require even more
strict application of the law of defamation to accomplish the needful greater protection to passive innocent victims.
No judicial authority has been found to support the assertion
that the strict law of defamation is too harsh a rule for application to the broadcaster.6" This same contention, often in almost
identical language, has frequently been urged in favor of immnunity for newspaper publishers, but has been unlesitatingly rejected
by the courts.65
64

0nly three decisions on the question appear as yet to have been handed
down by appellate courts in this country, in each case approving the application of the newspaper analogy to publication of the speaker's defamatory
utterances through transmission to the radio public by the operations of the
broadcasting station. See Sorensen v. Wood, (1932) 123 Neb. 348, 243
N. W. 82, 82 A. L. R. 1098; Miles v. Wasmer, Inc., (1933) 172 Wash. 466,
20 P. (2d) 847; Coffee v. Midland Broadcasting Co., (1934) 8 F. Supp. 889.
In Meldrum v. Australian Broadcasting Co., Ltd., [19321 Victorian
Law Reports, 425, the court intimates its opinion that the defamation involved is slander rather than libel, basing its conclusion on the palpable
misconception of the analogy of oral speech. As to this question, see
footnotes 85-88 below with accompanying text.
65
Barnes v. Campbell, (1879) 59 N. H. 128 is a leading case. See also
Parsons v. Age Herald Publ. Co., (1913) 181 Ala. 439, 61 So. 345; Washington Herald Co. v. Berry, (1914) 41 App. D. C. 322; Lundin v. Post Pub.
Co., (1914) 217 Mass. 213, 104 N. E. 480; Swarz v. Evening News Co.,
(1913) 84 N. J. L 486, 87 Ati. 148; Williams v. Black, (1910) 24 S.D. 501,
124 N. AV. 728; Williams Printing Co. v. Saunders, (1912) 113 Va. 156.
73 S.E. 472.
The only case in which the contention referred to in the text has been
judicially recognized appears to be Layne v. Tribune Co., (1933) 108 Fla.
177, 146 So. 234, 86 A. L. R. 466. This case is expressly repudiated on
substantially identical facts in Oklahoma Pub. Co. v. Givens, (C.C.A. 10th
Cir. 1933) 67 F. (2d) 62. In 86 A. L. R. 475-477, too, are cited a number
of cases directly contrary to the case of Layne v. Tribune Co. on substan-

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

That the burden of responsibility for defamation is not too
heavy as a practical matter for newspapers to bear is conclusively
demonstrated by the manifest fact that the newspaper business has
grown and flourished to its present gigantic proportions tnder
the law of defamation as it now stands. It may be added that the
radio broadcasting industry has under the same law enjoyed an
even more phenomenal growth in a much shorter time.00
5. The Conflicting Interests at Stake-Individual Interests.Would it be socially advantageous to apply to the broadcaster the
more lenient rules of the law of negligence? Would more important interests be conserved by such a change in the applicable
law than the interests necessarily sacrificed in the process?
Manifestly the private interest of the broadcaster is to be free
from liability to the victims of his defamatory publishing operations.6 T Equally clear is the individual interest of the victim in
personal protection in the form of a recovery of compensation
from the financially responsible publisher.08 Unless the inquiry
tially identical facts. On the merits, too, the analysis by which the case of
Layne v. Tribune Co. was decided involved two erroneous assumptions which
vitiate the reasoning relied upon. The court was mistaken in requiring an
affirmative showing of "malice," as an element in the cause of action for
defamation, in effect going back to the long obsolete doctrine of Parson
Prick's Case (1605) and overlooking or misconceiving the development of
modern times on that head, briefly described in footnote 36 above. The court
also was mistaken in asserting that under the familiar applications of strict
liability for defamation newspapers could not continue to discharge their
functions of publication with efficiency and promptness, thus completely
shutting its eyes to the manifest fact that it is precisely tinder such strict
rules of liability that the modern press with its efficiency and promptness
has been developed.
66See
footnote No. I above for statistical details.
67That the broadcasting industry has been keenly conscious of this
interest is readily apparent from the resolutions of the National Association
of Broadcasters at its Annual Convention in October, 1931:
"Resolved, That in any proposed state legislation seeking to extend
state libel or slander laws to cover utterances by radio . . . such proposed
state legislation should specifically relieve the broadcaster of any liability
in respect to utterances regarding which he could not, with the exercise of
reasonable care, have had knowledge in advance of the actual broadcast
thereof." (Part of Resolution No. 7, reported in (1932) 2 J. Radio L. 178.)
Essentially embodying the same viewpoint is the elaborate argument of
John W. Guider on this point in favor of broadcasting stations, as appearing
in (1932)
2 J. Radio L. 708, especially 711-713.
68
While unsuspecting potential victims as a class in the nature of things
can have no formulated opinions on the matter, individual parties who have
been thus victimized readily manifest their consciousness of this interest
after the injury has been inflicted. The following statement may conveniently serve as illustration. "I therefore prosecuted an appeal to the supreme
court in order to secure, if possible, a rule of law which would protect
myself and other persons from libelous attacks over the air by irresponsible
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is carried further, therefore, than the mere matter of the conflicting individual interests of the publisher and his victim, no case
for change from the rules applicable to other publishers is made
out in connection with defamation by radio. Here, as in other
defamation cases, relaxing the rule of strict liability involved in
the law of defamation in order to afford more leniency to the active
publisher under the milder rules of negligence would be directly
at the expense of the passive innocent victim of his defamatory
publications.
6. The Social Interests Affected-Promotion of Broadcasting
Enterpise.-Is special leniency to broadcasters desirable in order
to promote broadcasting enterprise? The change from defamnation to negligence as the basis for liability is not needed in order
to secure ample broadcasting service in the interest of the public
of radio listeners. The business of radio broadcasting has already
attained the proportions of a very large and powerful business."
The commercial opportunities for profit in this business, despite
unknown risks of all sorts, have been so great as to attract investments in broadcasting enterprises far too numerous for the available broadcast band to carry.70 It has been necessary for the Federal Radio Commission to eliminate many stations.' Applications
for new stations have often been rejected on the broad ground.
character assassins who are barred from using newspapers." (Statement
of C. A. Sorensen, plaintiff and appellee, filed in connection with the defendant station's motion for a rehearing in the second appeal in the case of
Sorensen v. Wood, No. 28749, unreported, as reprinted in appellant's brief
for rehearing at p. 10.)
That speakers at the microphone are frequently if not usually persons
of no financial responsibility is notorious.
"When outside speakers not in the employ of the broadcasting company are given access to the microphone for the broadcasting of their
speeches for a consideration paid to the broadcasting company, it may at
times occur that among such outside speakers there may be persons without
substantial financial responsibility." (From stipulation filed in the second
appeal to the supreme court of Nebraska in Sorensen v. Wood, no. 28749,
unreported.)
69
See footnote no. 1 above.
7
OThe prevailing chaos before the Federal Radio Act of 1927 is vividly
described in the first report of the American Bar Association's Standing
Committee on Radio Law. See (1929) 54 A. B. A. Rep. 442.
71
See footnote I above. In Sproul v. Federal Radio Commission, (1931)
60 App. D. C. 333, 54 F. (2d) 444, an application for renewal of the broadcasting license was denied by the Federal Radio Commission and its action
was upheld by the court on the ground of the licensee's insolvency. That
overcrowding may justify the deletion of existing stations though in other
respects efficiently and satisfactorily operated, see Federal Radio Commission v. Nelson Bros. Bond and Mortgage Co., (1933) 289 U. S. 266, 53
Sup. Ct. 627, 77 L. Ed. 1166.
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among others, that the field is already overcrowded with broadcasting stations. 72 The radio industry has in some respects attained
even semi-monopolistic proportions. 73 For supplying the public of
listeners with efficient broadcasting service the radio industry
needs no new special favors at the expense of passive innocent
victims of its defamatory publications.
Nor is such a change needed in order to provide reasonably
effective protection for the broadcaster himself with respect to his
transmission of utterances without his realizing at the moment
their defamatory character. Through scrutiny of the manuscript
to be transmitted the broadcaster can protect himself approximately as may the newspaper by scrutiny of the "copy." The
broadcaster can also at his discretion require indemnity in advance
from the speaker or advertiser who furnishes the words to be
transmitted by the operations of the broadcaster. 74 Alternatively,
the broadcaster can in addition arrange for insurance against liability for defamatory broadcasts, charging the expense of such
insurance protection as an overhead expense to be reimbursed in
the rates charged for broadcasting service. Through such devices
the broadcaster can shift the risk of defamation by his broadcasting
operations from himself as immediate perpetrator to his advertisers who furnish the defamatory utterances and in whose interest
he performs the broadcasting operations which transmit those
utterances to the world. There is no necessity for throwing the
risk and damage upon his passive and innocent victims.
Nor is the change from defamation to negligence as the basis
for liability needed in order to protect broadcasting stations against
feigned claims for damages from defamation. Such a consideration has not greater but less weight in the case of radio broadcasters than it has in the case of newspapers, where it has often been
rejected.75 Radio broadcasters have the same protection against
feigned claims afforded to all publishers by the rules of evidence
and the ordinary processes of legal procedure where it may become
necessary to distinguish truth from falsehood.
72

See the department entitled "Decisions of the Federal Radio Commission," in the successive numbers of the Journal of Radio Law. The frequency of the notation, "application denied," is almost monotonous in its
regularity.
7"See, for instance, De Forest Radio Co. v. Radio Corporation of America, (C.C.A. 3rd Cir. 1931) 47 F. (2d) 606.
T4
The comparable practice of provision for indemnity to a sheriff who
is asked to make a levy of execution on specific property is familiar.
7"See footnotes nos. 34, 35, and 60 above.
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Furthermore, the removal of absolute legal responsibility for
such defamatory utterances from the only party to their publication that has any substantial financial responsibility would greatly
increase the incentive to such defamation while leaving innocent
victims without effective redress. The superior convenience and
effectiveness, for many occasions, of personal speech transmitted
by radio over the printed page or platform address has tremendously multiplied the dangers to victims of such defamation. The
change from defamation to negligence would in large measure
abrogate the law of defamation for precisely those cases where its
application is most needed. 6 By such a change the elements of
general welfare involved in protection to the public of innocent
victims against such "character assassination" would be ruthlessly sacrificed.
7. The Social Interests Affected-Promotion of Public Discussion.-A contention has in certain quarters been urged that
special leniency ought to be accorded to the broadcaster, beyond
what is accorded to the individual speaker, in order to promote
free public discussion by radio of matters of public interest. This
contention, reduced to its lowest terms, is that unless negligence
is substituted for defamation as the basis for liability the broadcaster will be forced to the alternative of either exercising censor7
ship or refusing to broadcast political speeches. T
That this argument as a common law matter is without substance is readily demonstrable., 8 In the first place, the unsupported conjecture that broadcasting service must be withdrawn
from public discussion of political questions if the law of defamation is applied is completely belied by the actual facts. The incen76See statements quoted in note 68 above.
77"If

the broadcaster has no power of censorship over political candi-

dates, but still is responsible for what he says, then radio must be closed as
an avenue for circulation of platforms and campaign material." Appellant
station's statement as to jurisdiction, in KFAB Broadcasting Co. v. Sorensen, (1933) 290 U. S. 599, 54 Sup. Ct. 209, 78 L. Ed. 526.
To the same general effect, see argument in favor of the broadcasting
station in the Report of the American Bar Association's Standing Committee on Communications, criticising the decision in Sorensen v. Wood, (1932)
57 A. B. A. Rep. 447, 482. See also Guider, Liability for Defamation in
Political Broadcasts, (1932) 2 J. Radio L. 708, and Caldwell, Freedom of
Speech and Radio Broadcasting, (1935) 177 Annals of the American
Academy
of Political and Social Science, 1-29.
7
8That such arguments are without merit even as applied to the radio
station's claim of special privilege under sec. 18 of the Federal Radio Act
of 1927, see Sorensen v. Wood, (1932) 123 Neb. 348, 243 N. W. 82. The
radio station's contention under the Federal Radio Act is examined at some
length in Void, Defamation by Radio, (1932) 2 J. Radio L 673, 692-702.
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tive of profits obtainable in political broadcasting as an inducement to engaging therein has from the beginning far exceeded the
deterrent effect of possible liability that has been involved .7
Again, it is very clear that broadcasters need not, as a practical matter, exclude political broadcasts from their programs in
order to protect themselves against the burdens of accountability
for their transmission of defamatory utterances. Through indemnity8° or insurance the broadcaster can arrange for the desired
practical protection for himself without any necessity whatever of
choosing between exercising censorship or refusing to broadcast
political advertising. By such means the burdens of accountability
can in cases of this type be shifted from the broadcaster who performs the operations of transmission to the party who supplies
the defamatory utterances and for whom the broadcast is made.
It is by no means necessary for the broadcaster's protection to
throw the burden on the helpless public of innocent victims.
The argument for greater leniency to the broadcaster in order
to promote freedom of public discussion rests on the contention
that radio broadcasts of political utterances ought, in the interest
of the general welfare, to be regarded as privileged occasions for
the broadcaster. It is to be noted, however, that in the majority
of American jurisdictions political utterances are not as such
regarded as privileged.81 Where political utterances as such are in
the particular jurisdiction regarded as privileged, the broadcaster,
of course, enjoys such privilege to the same extent as does the
speaker at the microphone. Where no such privilege is recognized
79It is matter of common knowledge how very widespread was the use
of radio broadcasting in the presidential campaign of 1932 as contrasted
with the earlier presidential campaign of 1928, and how insignificant as
compared with these was its use in the presidential campaign of 1924. There
was no political broadcasting in the campaign of 1920, the first experiments
at broadcasting being undertaken in that year for dissemination of election
returns. (1929) 54 A. B. A. Rep. 439.
8
aSee footnote 74 above.
81
Leading cases are Post Publishing Co. v. Hallam, (C.C.A. 6th Cir.
1893) 59 Fed. 530, and Commonwealth v. Clapp, (1808) 4 Mass. 163. A
leading case presenting the minority view is Coleman v. MacLennan, (1908)
78 Kans. 711, 98 Pac. 281. For a convenient compilation of authorities, see
Newell, Slander and Libel, 4th ed., secs. 440-444. In Caldwell, Freedom of
Speech and Radio Broadcasting, (1935) 177 Annals of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science, 1-29, is given an elaborate argument against government censorship of radio broadcasting, with the incidental position included that all broadcasting of political utterances ought
to be privileged on the part of the broadcaster. The present writer can
approve the policy of establishing a wide application for privilege for all
publishers of political utterances, without being able to see any reason for
making the broadcaster's privilege wider than the speaker's.
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for the political speaker, it is clear that in such jurisdictions the
utterance of political charges false in fact and defamatory in character is not regarded as being in the public interest. Such false
and defamatory utterances cannot be regarded as being in the
public interest merely because they are published through radio
broadcasting operations if they are not to be so regarded if published through other forms of communication. The only ground
suggested for such a special privilege to the broadcaster not equally
applicable to the speaker at the microphone is the totally erroneous
and unsupported assumption that otherwise broadcasting service
must be withdrawn from all political discussion. This assumption, as already seen, 2 is directly contrary to the actual facts in
the broadcasting industry.
II.

THE APPLICATION OF THE LAW OF DEFAMATION TO TH1E
FACTS OF DEFAMATION BY RADIO

Granting that the law of defamation, not the law of negligence,
is applicable as the basis for the broadcaster's liability for defamation by radio, the question of what branch of the law of defamation is properly to be invoked in the instance still remains to be
explored.
1. Defamation by Radio is Equivalent to Libel Rather thans
Slander.-The broad and loose popular generalization that spoken
defamation is slander and written defamation is libel fails to indicate how defamation by conduct ought to be classified. As a matter of fact, however, defamatory impressions may be communicated not only through unassisted oral speech and through the
written and printed page, but also through a multitude of other
devices. Familiar today among such other devices for conveying
impressions are pictures, effigies, mechanical noises, talking pictures, phonograph records. New fact combinations in this regard
may be expected to arise as human ingenuity applied to current
mechanical progress recognizes new opportunities and seeks to
utilize them for the achievement of ends in view. Many cases are
now of record where defamation has been perpetrated not by mere
speech but by conduct.83 New phases of defamation by conduct
must be dealt with as they arise.
In radio broadcasting, as already pointed out, the speaker's
82
83

See footnote 79 above, with accompanying text.
See footnote 33 above.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
mere oral utterances spoken into the microphone do not automatically and unassisted result in satisfactory transmission of
intelligible and continuously audible speech. As already set out
in detail above, there are required in addition the broadcaster's
delicate, continual operations of modulation readjustment as the
speech proceeds.84 The further circumstance may also be noticed
that the utterance in question frequently consists of a written or
printed composition which the speaker reads from the manuscript8 "
into the microphone. Obviously, the broadcaster's operations
transmitting the speaker's utterances to the radio audience, whether
or not the speaker uses a manuscript, constitute neither speaking
nor writing but are much more accurately described as "conduct."
It is therefore very clear that attempts to classify defamation
by radio "on principle" as constituting slander because of the oral
utterance of words into the microphone 6 are hopelessly erroneous.
It is not true as a fact that defamation by radio is oral defamation
even in cases where the speaker at the microphone delivers iipromptu utterances without the use of any prepared manuscript.
Radio transmission in that case, as in every other, takes place
through active operations by the broadcaster which manifestly constitute "conduct" on his part8 7 rather than mere speech. Unless
84

See footnote 14 to 26 above, with accompanying text.
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The interesting question of oral publication of written defamation is
thus brought into the range of attention regarding its application. That
such publication is itself libel as well as slander seems to be well settled,
the decisions being rendered, however, in cases where the existence of the
writing was known to the listener. Case de Libelles Famosis. (1605) 5 Co.
Rep. 125a; Lamb's Case, (1610) 9 Co. Rep. 59b, Moore K. B. 813; Snyder
v. Andrews, (1849) 6 Barb. (N.Y.) 43; Forrester v. Tyrrell, (1893) 57
J. P. 532, 9 T. L. R. 257.
Whether the same conclusion can be supported in cases where the
listener is not aware of the writing has been ingeniously argued. Compare
opinions in Osborn v. Thomas Boulter & Son, [19301 2 K. B. 226, 99
L. J. K. B. 556, and in Meldrum v. Australian Broadcasting Co., Ltd.,
[1932] V. L. R. (Aust.) 425, described in (1932) 6 Aust. L. J. 301. See
also observations in footnotes 86 and 87 below.
"See conflicting viewpoints expressed in the opinions in Meldruln v.
Australian Broadcasting Co., Ltd., [1932] V. L. R. (Aust.) 425. described
in (1932) 6 Aust. L. J. 301; Davis, Law of Radio Communication 158;
Ashby, Legal Aspects of Radio Broadcasting, (1930) 1 Air L. Rev. 331,
343; note in (1932) 46 Harv. L. Rev. 134. See also 7 Aust. L. J. 257-62.
All these attempts at classification of publication by radio broadcasting
as slander have gone on the unexamined and totally erroneous assumption
that transmission by radio of the speaker's utterances into the microphone
is purely automatic. The conclusions rested thereon are therefore without
value, whether with reference to the speaker's liability or with reference to
the broadcaster's liability. That transmission by radio is not thus automatic,
87 see footnotes 8-27 above, with accompanying text.
See footnote 84 above.
Publication of defamation by radio amounting to publication of libel by
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the term "slander" is to be so enlarged as to cover not only oral
speech but defamation by conduct as well, the facts of radio transmission of defamatory utterances do not fall within it. On the
other hand, defamation by conduct has ordinarily by the authorities been held equivalent to libel. 8
The law of defamation has been extended from relatively narrow beginnings in early slander cases to much wider grounds of
liability in the libel cases. This difference in the form of publication became conspicuous when writing and printing first came into
general use, following upon the invention of the printing press.
The difference in form was seized upon as the occasion for enforcing a wider liability for written defamation than was available
under the older more narrowly confined slander precedents."'
There can thus be no question that the wider liability was grounded
in the recognition of need for greater protection against written
defamation, however inadequate in detail may at times have
appeared the explanations often set out that the deliberation
involved was greater, the diffusion wider and the resulting damage consequently more serious.Y0 There has been a clear-cut hisconduct, each of the joint tortfeasors, the speaker and the broadcaster.
would seem to be equally accountable for the libelous publication, whether
or not reading from a manuscript was involved.
"Peck v. Tribune Co., (1909) 214 U. S. 185, 29 Sup. Ct. 554, 53 L Ed.
960 (picture); Merle v. Sociological Research Film Corporation, (1915)
166 App. Div. 376, 152 N. Y. S. 829 (movie) ; Schultz v. Frankfort Marine,
Accident & Plate Glass Ins. Co., (1913) 151 Wis. 537, 139 N. W. 386 (notorious shadowing); Peterson v. Western Union, (1898) 72 Minn. 41, 74
N. W. 1022, 40 L. R. A. 661 (telegraphic transmission, reduced to writing
by receiving operator); Varner v. Morton, (1919) 52 N. S. (Can.) 180
(charivari) ; Monson v. Tussaud, [1894] 1 Q. B. 671, 692, 63 L. J. Q. B.
454 (effigy); Brewer v. Dew, (1843) 11 M. & W. 625, 12 L. J. Ex. 448
(seizing goods on unfounded claim of debt). See also footnote 92 below.
8
9"The invention of the separate tort of libel for the first time put the
most important branch of the law of defamation on a satisfactory footing."
8 Holdsworth, History of English Law 366.
"The modern torts of slander and libel represent two different strata
of legal development. Slander represents the tort developed in the sixteenth
and early seventeenth centuries in and through the action on the case. Libel
represents the tort created by the judges of the latter part of the seventeenth
century in order to remedy those defects of the tort developed in the earlier
period. . . . Their action put the tort of libel on the right lines, and if
ever an assimilation between the two torts is effected by the Legislature. it
will be taken as the model." 8 Holdsworth, History of English Law 367.
"The distinction between slander and libel grew up in English law
early in the 17th century. Judges, frightened as it were, by the power of
the printed word, decided that printed slander should be considered greater
in effect than oral slander. From it grew the principle that a thing may
be libel when written which would not be slander if spoken." Davis, Radio
Law, 2nd ed., p. 101.
9OIn Thorley v. Lord Kerry, (1812) 4 Taunt. 355, 3 Camp. 214, n.
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torical trend from the narrow beginnings in the old slander cases
to wider grounds of liability in the more dangerous wrong of libel.
As applied to the present question this clear-cut historical trend in
the law of defamation would therefore indicate that the wider
grounds of liability found in the law of libel rather than the narrower grounds in the law of slander are applicable to the still
more dangerous form of defamation by conduct now presented
in transmission by radio."
Again, novel forms of publication of defamatory matter
through conduct, where neither mere writing nor mere speech
have been involved, have in common law adjudications almost
invariably been held equivalent to libel rather than slander.9
Statutory definitions of libel have also strongly indicated the same
trend."3 The seriousness of the damage involved through defamation by conduct, even though there may have been no permanent
record, has usually been regarded as sufficient reason for treating
variant and odd cases of publication of defamation in the same way
Mansfield, C. J., sets forth a dictum that the generally asserted reasons
for distinguishing slander and libel are not in their details consistently convincing, but admits that the distinction has become established as a matter
of authority.
91
"So far as concerns defamatory matter, the common law distinctions
between libel and slander (both as to criminal and civil responsibility) seem
to be based upon the more permanent nature and the wider dissemination
of libelous statements. The invention of radio broadcasting has created a
means of giving to oral defamatory utterances a wideness of circulation
greater than that now generally given to written defamation." Davis, Radio
Law, 2nd ed., 69.
"Libel is more heavily punished than slander, because of its greater possibility of harm, and the greater deliberateness on the part of the perpetrator.
...On the mischief side, radio defamation certainly would seem to be more
like libel than like slander." Zollman, Law of the Air 125.
"If, indeed, the distinction between libel and slander truly lies in the
fact that the former is more likely to cause mischief than the other, then it
might seriously be argued that broadcasting defamatory statements constitutes a libel and not a slander. The time would indeed appear to be now
ripe for the abolition of this distinction altogether." (1926) 70 Sol. J. 613.
92
See authorities cited in footnote 88 above.
Various additional illustrations are enumerated in Odgers, Libel and
Slander, 5th ed., pp. 13-14.
In Gutsole v. Mathers, (1836) 1 M. & W. 495, 501, 5 L. J. Ex. 274,
however, occurs a dictum that a gesture is equivalent to slander.
93
Typical of the most advanced statutory definitions of libel is the
following:
"Every malicious publication by writing, printing, picture, effigy, sign,
or otherwise than by mere speech, which shall expose . . . to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy . . . shall be a libel.
Mason's 1927 Minn.
Stat., sec. 10112. (Criminal libel).
Substantially to the same effect are Washington, Compiled Statutes,
(Remington 1922), sec. 2424, and New York, Consolidated Laws (Cahill
1930), ch. 41, sec. 1340.
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as libel. 94 On this basis, too, the highly dangerous publication of
defamation by radio, 5 involving transmission by conduct on the
part of the broadcaster rather than merely by oral speech, must be
regarded as equivalent to libel rather than slander.96
On the mischief side, it is well again to emphasize, defamation
by radio under present conditions has infinitely larger possibilities
of harm than either of the familiar older types of defamation. Its
potentialities as a blaster of reputations are by comparison boundless. Libel was at the outset regarded as a more serious wrong
than slander partly by reason of the greater damage from wider
diffusion and greater permanence of the written word.-- Similarly,
defamation by radio is manifestly an even more serious wrong
than ordinary libel by reason of its immeasurably wider diffusion.
To this must be added the far greater power of the understood
human voice to stir the emotions of listeners.98 Furthermore,
defamation by radio is in the ordinary course not impulsive, but
represents quite as much deliberation as does the ordinary written message. 9 Defamation by radio, infinitely more serious than
94See footnotes 88 and 92 above.
95Recognition of such danger with specific application to radio is
already manifest in legislation, enacted or proposed, to extend the law of
criminal libel to radio broadcasts. Legislation to this general effect has
been enacted in California. See California, Penal Code (Chase 1931), sec.
258, which is discussed at some length in Davis, Radio Law 99-107. Similar
legislation was enacted in Oregon in 1931. See (1931) 1 J. Radio L. 574,
577, 578. Bills to the same general effect have been actively introduced in
the legislatures of several other states though without at the time culminating in enactment. See, for Minnesota. (1931) 1 J. Radio L. 576-577; for
New York, (1932) 2 J. Radio L. 403-404; for Ohio, (1931) 1 J. Radio L
401; for Texas, (1931) 1 J. Radio L. 401-402.
96See footnotes 84-88 above, with accompanying text.
978 Holdsworth, History of English Law 366; Dole v. Lyon, (1813)
10 Johns. (N.Y.) 447; Cooper v. Greeley, (1845) 1 Denio (N.Y.) 347. 362;
Colby v. Reynolds, (1834) 6 Vt. 489; Veeder, in 3 Select Essays on AngloAmerican Legal History 446-473. See to the same effect, (1926) 70 Sol.
J. 613.
98"One can influence people with the spoken word in a way in which
it cannot
be done by the printed word." Davis, Radio Law, 2d ed., 102.
99
In overruling a demurrer to a complaint seeking to hold a radio station accountable for defamatory utterances broadcast, one trial court
answered as follows the contention that language broadcast by radio was
slander rather than libel:
"If it is written or printed it has more harmful effects upon the person concerned and it carries with it the inference of deliberation and preparation. We all discount things that are said on impulse, perhaps in the course
of a quarrel, but when we read a thing in print or in writing we realize
then that that has been given consideration and that the consequences have
been undoubtedly reflected upon.
"Everybody knows, I think, or most people know when they hear a
statement over the radio that that statement is not an extemporaneous
affair, that it is a prepared statement and that it represents deliberation and
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either slander or libel as a blaster of reputations, might appropriately be given the distinctive name "blaster." The need for protection against such "blaster" is by reason of its conspicuously
greater possibilities of mischief at least as great as it is in cases
of ordinary libel. Every substantial reason historically familiar
for imposing a wider liability for libel than for slander is manifestly at hand to indicate that publication of defamatory utterances
by radio must be regarded as at least equivalent to libel.
The leading commentators on the historical development of the
law of defamation regard the narrow restrictions of the law of
slander as unsound and obsolescent. They do not hesitate to commend the viewpoint that the broader rules of libel should as an
original question be applied throughout the entire field of defamation.10 ° However that may be, such a viewpoint would clearly
require the application of the law of libel rather than slander to
novel conduct controlled by no previous authority and involving a
"blaster" of reputation through defamation by radio.
2. The Newspaper Analogy.-The newspaper analogy is very
close to the facts of publication by radio with respect to shaping
the form in which the transmitted message is conveyed. When a
manuscript is submitted to a newspaper for publication, it is readily
understood that the newspaper publisher contributes no authorship
to the composition published. The newspaper publisher, however,
does set in type, print and distribute the statement contributed by
the advertiser or other contributor in manuscript form. Incidentally, in such processes of setting in type and printing, the newsreflection and preparation of the announcer or person who has submitted it
for broadcasting.
"It undoubtedly must be true, then, that we will have to regard the
prepared statement submitted to the radio company for publication over
the radio in the same category with libel. I do not see how it can be
regarded otherwise." (From account of the hearing on the demurrer unreported in Miles v. Wasmer as given in (1932) 2 J. of Radio L. 161, 162.)
When the case of Miles v. Wasmer later came before the appellate
court, that court on this point expressed itself as follows: "The reading of
that manuscript over the broadcasting station is the basis of this action.
In the briefs, there is some discussion as to whether the action is one for
libel or for slander. This question we shall not decide, because, in so far
as this case is concerned, it is immaterial." Miles v. Wasmer, (1933) 172
Wash.00 466, 20 P. (2d) 847, 848.
1 "The third method, which is alike the simplest and the best, is to
abolish at once the distinction between libel and slander, and assimilate the
law of slander to that of libel." Veeder, History and Theory of the Law
of Defamation, (1904) 4 Col. L. Rev. 54.
"Their action put the tort of libel on the right lines, and if ever an
assimilation between the two torts is effected by the Legislature, it will be
taken as the model." 8 Holdsworth, History of English Law 367.
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paper publisher may correct the spelling or improve the punctuation found in the manuscript in order to make the statements contained in the manuscript more readily intelligible to readers who
will see them in the printed form. The newspaper publisher thus,
while in the instance contributing no authorship, does, by his operations of publication, give shape to the printed form, many) times
multiplied, through which the writer's message is transmitted to
recipients of the paper.
When attention is given to this aspect in radio broadcasting as
now conducted, it is manifest that the broadcaster by his operations very similarly shapes the form of the sounds through which
the speaker's utterances at the microphone are transmitted to the
radio audience. As already set out above,101 it is necessary for the
broadcaster through the delicate operations of continual modulation readjustment as the speech proceeds so to reshape the sounds
as uttered into the microphone that the resulting transmission can
be picked up by receiving sets in the form of intelligible and
continuously audible speech. By the delicate operations of modulation readjustment as the speech proceeds the broadcaster as it
were selects 0 2 from the sounds uttered into the microphone by
the speaker those portions most suitable for transmission. In
addition he so rearranges"0 3 those portions as to secure their effective reception both by near and more distant radio listeners in
the form of intelligible and continuously audible speech. Comparable to the printed form contributed by the newspaper publisher as the vehicle for transmission of the author's manuscript,
the operations of the broadcaster contribute the particular form
to which the sounds uttered by the speaker into the microphone
must be reshaped in order by radio transmission to secure their
effective reception by radio listeners as intelligible and continuously audible speech.
The newspaper is also very close to the facts of publication by
radio with respect to control over the contents published. It is
readily understood that the newspaper publisher under ordinary
circumstances through scrutiny of manuscript and proof reading
can exercise very effective control over the contents published
through his operations. He can not, however, as a practical matter recognize and stop every statement that may turn out to be
lolSee footnotes nos. 8-25 above, with accompanying text.
102 As to both selection and rearrangement, see footnotes nos. 18-20
above.03

See footnote 102 above.
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defamatory.1 0 4 Under the circumstances the newspaper publisher
makes the best he can out of the practical situation. Using due
care, he nevertheless runs the risk, very real but usually not very
great, that he may be answerable for occasional defamatory matter inadvertently published.
From the standpoint of program control the situation of the
radio broadcaster is not strikingly different but closely similar.
Under ordinary circumstances, as in the case of the newspaper
publisher, the broadcaster exercises complete control. True, also
as in the case of the newspaper, occasional lapses may occur which
no amount of care on its part practically exercisable can coinpletely guard against.10°
In both cases, under the policy cibodied in the law of defamation, such risks must be borne by the
commercial publisher whose active operations created the risks
and caused the damage instead of being thrown without redress
upon his passive innocent victims.
The newspaper analogy is also very close to the facts of publication by radio with respect to competition in business. Newspaper publication and publication by radio are strikingly similar
from the standpoint of the commercial facts of direct business
competition in the service rendered by each type of publication.
Each acts as an advertising medium in the creation of consumer
demand by those who have something to sell.100 The profits of
such advertising furnish the major business income for the sake
of which each type of publishing business is undertaken and maintained. 11 7 Each charges as advertising rates such amounts as it
sees fit." ° The newspaper sells "space" to its advertisers. The
0

1

4See footnotes 60-63 above, and accompanying text.

105 See notes 61-63 above, with accompanying text.
t
°rEven a casual glance over the details of the schedule of an ordinary
'!ay's broadcasting program is enough to verify this statement.
107
"The only manner in which this station can continue to furnish entertainment to the public without cost to the listener is by selling a part of its
time on the air to people desiring to advertise themselves or their goods."
From defendant station's exhibit No. 6, as appearing in the Bill of Exceptions at page 97, in the case of Sorensen v. Wood, (1932) 123 Neb. 348,
243 N. W. 82.
"... the revenue derived from political broadcasts is one of the means
which enables broadcasters to continue furnishing radio entertainment."
From appellant station's statement as to jurisdiction, p. 6, in KFAB Broadcasting
Co. v. Sorensen, (1933) 290 U. S. 599, 54 Sup. Ct. 209, 78 L. Ed. 527.
10
In the case of In re Complaint of Sta-Shine Products, Inc., (1932)
188 I. C. C. 271, the Interstate Commerce Commission held, by a divided
membership, that it had no jurisdiction under the Interstate Commerce Act
to deal with the rates charged for broadcasting.
It is common knowledge that the broadcasting rates for advertising are
in this country fixed as a matter of course by private contract.
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broadcasting station sells "time" to its advertisers. Not only are
the two publication services in direct competition for the business
profits to be derived from publication of commercial advertising, 109 but they are also to a considerable extent in direct competition in the dissemination of current news as a means for attracting attention to the advertising furnished. News items as well as
music or other entertainment features have often been interspersed
between the commercial advertising utterances as the carrying bait
to induce radio listeners to turn to or remain in touch with the
particular broadcasting station. Within the last year or two such
news features in radio broadcasts have become sufficiently conspicuous to provoke efforts on the part of press associations to
stop their recurrence. 110
Finally the newspaper analogy is also very close to publication
by radio with respect to the need for protection for passive innocent victims. Reference may again be briefly made to the fact,
elucidated more at length in other connections,111 that defamation
by radio is even more dangerous to innocent victims than is defamation by newspaper. As compared with defamation by newspaper, passive innocent victims of defamation by radio require
not less but greater protection.
Whether viewed, therefore, from the stanpoint of active shaping of the form of the transmitted message, from the standpoint
of practical control over its content, from the standpoint of the
commercial facts of direct business competition between newspaper publication and publication by radio, or from the standpoint of needed protection for passive innocent victims of defamation, it is emphatically true that the two types of publication
are very closely analogous. Unless some convincing reason of
policy can be adduced to the contrary, unless some convincing
' 09 "Such commercial advertising is strongly competitive with newspaper advertising because it performs a similar office between those having
wares to advertise and those who are potential users of those -ares. Radio
advertising is one of the most powerful agencies in promoting the principles
of religion and of politics. It competes with newspapers, magazines and
publications of every nature." Goss, C. J., in Sorensen v. Wood, (1932)
123 Neb. 348, 243 N. W. 82, 86.
"10 Press items relating to the national meeting of the Associated Press
in the Spring of 1933 reported the passage there of a resolution that "it is
the sense of this meeting that the board of directors shall not allow any
news distributed by the Associated Press, regardless of source, to be given
to any radio chain or chains." The resolution also provided that no member newspaper of the Associated Press should be allowed to broadcast other
than brief bulletins.
"'See footnotes 56, 95, 97, 98, 99, above, with accompanying text.
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reason involving the general welfare can be shown to require special favors for broadcasting publishers, it would seem clear that
both types of publishers with respect to liability for defamation
should be treated alike. Such equal treatment is required not only
for the elementary justice of equal treatment before the law for
direct commercial competitors, but such equal treatment is also
required in order to provide in each case equal protection for the
passive innocent victims of such defamatory publications. 12
3. The Telephone Analogy.-Radio broadcasting is not analogous to telephone service. No cases have been found holding
telephone companies responsible for defamatory utterances occurring in telephone conversations between users of telephones.
It is therefore natural for spokesmen for radio broadcasters to
suggest the telephone as a possible analogy"' by the application of
which to hold that no liability rests on the broadcaster for defamation by radio. This suggestion also takes advantage of such
familiar similarity in popular thought between the two services
as is indicated in the descriptive term "radiophone." Closer examination of the operating facts for the two services, as well as
comparison of the business factors involved, readily demonstrate,
however, that the claimed analogy is extremely far-fetched. It is
equally clear that the application of the telephone analogy to
the question of defamation by radio would be productive not only
of injustice to passive innocent victims but also of pernicious
consequences inimical to the general welfare.
In the first place, telephone transmission and radio transmission are conspicuously different in the vital circumstance that
ordinary telephone transmission is a purely automatic process
"12 "The fundamental principles of the law involved in publication by a
newspaper and by a radio station seem to be alike. There is no legal reason
why one should be favored over another nor why a broadcasting station
should be granted special favors as against one who may be a victim of a
libelous publication." Goss, C. J., in Sorensen v. Wood, (19,32) 123 Neb.
348, 243 N. W. 82, 86.
113"This is exactly like a friend renting a telephone, slandering somebody over it, and the plaintiff attempts to hold the telephone company in
damages." From defendant station's argument to the jury, Bill of Exceptions, page 248, at the original trial of Sorensen v. Wood, (1932) 123 Neb.
348, 243 N. W. 82.
"If it is important in solving the rules of law which must apply to
this case to compare a broadcaster with something else, the broadcaster
might with much more exactness be likened to the owner of a telephone
company who furnishes machinery permitting speech to be heard at distant
points from its origin." From defendant station's brief on appeal in the
second appeal in Sorensen v. Wood, no. 24749 (unreported, 1933) at p. 14.

DEFAMATION BY RADIO

while radio transmission is not. Merely the connection between
the parties is arranged by the telephone operator. Indeed, in
many modem telephone exchanges a dial system is employed by
the operation of which even the connections between parties are
made by the parties themselves. It is literally true in ordinary
telephone service that the company places the use of its equipment
at the disposal of subscribers for the purpose of telephonic communication and that the communication of words uttered by the
parties is automatically carried out by the equipment thus furnished. The telephone company thus does not directly participate
in the acts of ordinary transmission of telephone messages. In
the case of radio broadcasting, on the contrary, as has already been
elaborately set out, 114 the process of transmission as currently
conducted is not purely automatic. The radio broadcaster by his
voluntary active operations of transmission being himself a publisher of the defamatory utterances broadcast, he must on the
score of equality before the law be subject to the same liability as
other publishers unless he can show convincing reasons for special
favors not accorded by the law to other publishers.
In the second place, a telephone company is a common carrier
of messages, bound under the law applicable to such public titilities to provide message transmission service for senders of messages. As intimated both by a state court and by the Interstate
Commerce Commission, the radio broadcasting company is under
no such common carrier obligation.'
The whole background
of policy is thus strikingly different between the two services. It
is a matter of common knowledge that broadcasting stations control their own commercial advertising programs, exclude or deal
with individual advertisers, and by private contract fix rates for
their services as they see fit. 18 It is in actual broadcasting practice insisted that in the nature of things there cannot be any
obligation to serve any individual advertiser since stations must
control their own programs in order to preserve their good will with
the radio audience which makes their business commercially valuable."17 The National Association of Broadcasters has itself in
114See footnotes 10-27 above, with accompanying text.
" 5 "We are of the opinion that the defense of the company that it is a
common carrier is not available here." Goss, C. J.. in Sorensen v. Wood,
(1932) 123 Neb. 348, 243 N. W. 82, 87. See also action of Interstate Commerce Commission, referred to in footnote No. 108 above.
116See footnote No. 108 above.
Ut7"It has been the constant effort of this station to keep its entertainment entirely free from any objectionable matter." From defendant station's
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other connections very definitely taken the position that broadcasting stations are not common carriers and cannot properly be
so regarded under the law.118 The professional opinion has also
been expressed by counsel eminent in the field of radio law that
while radio broadcasting stations are affected with a public interest with regard to the listening radio public they cannot be regarded as common carriers owing any duties as such to any class
of senders of messages.119 The same position has been in substance approved in resolutions adopted by the American Bar Asexhibit 6, as appearing in the bill of exceptions at page 97, in Sorensen v.
Wood, (1932) 123 Neb. 348, 243 N. W. 82.
"I have always made an attempt to broadcast material over KFAB
that is the very best in the interest of the public and our listeners." From
testimony of defendant station's manager as appearing in the bill of exceptions at page 192 in Sorensen v. Wood, (1932) 123 Neb. 348, 243 N. W. 82.
"..
- the self-imposed censorship exercised by the program directors
of broadcasting stations who, for the sake of popularity and standing of
their stations will select entertainment and educational features according
to the needs and desires of their invisible audiences." From statement filed
by the Federal Radio Commission with the court of appeals of the District
of Columbia in the case of Great Lakes Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Radio
Commission, (1930) 59 App. D. C. 197, 37 F. (2d) 993, and copied in
(1931) 1 J. Radio L. 39-40.
11SResolution No. 10 adopted at the Ninth Annual Convention of the
National Association of Broadcasters reads as follows:
"Resolved, By the National Association of Broadcasters, in convention
assembled, that the executive committee of this association be, and it hereby
is, authorized and directed to make application to tile Interstate Commerce
Commission for permission to appear as intervener in the hearing of any
complaint before the said Interstate Commerce Commission in which the
alleged right or duty of said commission to establish or regulate rates for
broadcast advertising service appears to be an issue, for tile purpose of
presenting before the Interstate Commerce Commission the claim of this
Association that a radio broadcasting station is not and cannot be regarded
as a common carrier under the law." Quoted from (1932) 2 J. Radio L.
178.
119.. . The requirement of serving all who wish to speak over the
transmitter, however, is highly inconsistent with what, in the opinion of
the committee, ought to be the end to be achieved in broadcasting, namely,
good service consisting of entertainment, instruction, etc. to the listening
public. The broadcaster, by reason of his close contact with his listening
public and his selfish motive for desiring popularity for his station, is in
the best position to determine what form that service shall take; he should
be allowed to exercise the same discretion that the editor of a newspaper
or magazine, or the proprietor of a theatre, exercises. The only restriction
should be to the end that, in so far as the station's program consists of
discussion of public questions, it be fair alike to all candidates and to
opposing points of view.

.

.

. Broadcasting stations may be called 'public

utilities,' but they should be treated not as the common carrier group of
public utilities, such as telephone and telegraph lines, but as the public
service type, such as those engaged in furnishing light, heat, water and
power to a consuming public .... ." From Report of the American Bar
Association's Standing Committee on Radio Law, Louis G. Caldwell, Chairman, as appearing in (1929) 54 A. B. A. Rep. 490-491. To the same effect,
see (1931) 56 A. B. A. Rep. 98-100, being remarks by Chairman Caldwell
before the annual meeting of the American Bar Association.
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sociation on recommendation of its then functioning Committee
of Radio Law. 2 ° The Federal Radio Cormnission has also
emphatically expressed the same view. 121
It is abundantly clear, therefore, that the telephone company
as a common carrier of messages owes to the public of senders
the duty of furnishing them transmission service while the broadcasting company as a mere private business in this respect is under
no such obligation. Accordingly, even if the telephone company
was by its operations a technical publisher of such messages,
which is by no means clear, it could much more persuasively
claim to be entitled to a privilege 12 2 in cases of defamatory utterances than can the radio broadcasting company which is under no
legal duty to any sender to transmit the message offered.
In the third place, the need of innocent victims for redress
against defamation by radio is infinitely more urgent than against
defamation by telephone. In telephonic defamation the message
reaches one individual listener. In the ordinary course the extent
of its diffusion without further repetition by the hearer is therefore in such cases negligible. In consequence the actual damages
to reputation from such telephonic defamation, as distinguished
from damages from subsequent repetition, are as a practical matter in most cases entirely lacking. In defamation by radio broadcasting, on the other hand, utterances delivered by the speaker
into the microphone are by the active operations of the broad20
° "Resolved, That the Association adopts and approves Part IX of the
report of the Committee on Radio Law, and instructs the Committee on
Radio Law ....
(c) To oppose the enactment of any bill declaring broadcasting stations
to be common carriers or to be subject to a common carrier obligation witi,
respect to the transmission of communications." (1929) 54 A. B. A. Rep. 90.
121". ..
The public would be deprived of the advantage of the selfimposed censorship exercised by the program directors of broadcasting
stations who, for the sake of the popularity and standing of their stations
will select entertainment and educational features according to the needs
and desires of their invisible audiences. . . . To pursue the analogy of telephone and telegraph public utilities is, therefore, to emphasize the right
of the sender of messages to the detriment of the listening public. The
commission believes that such an analogy is a mistaken one when applied to
broadcasting stations; the emphasis should be on the receiving of service.
and the standard of public interest, convenience, or necessity should be
construed accordingly." From statement of the Federal Radio Commission
filed with the court of appeals of the District of Columbia in the case of
Great Lakes Broadcasting Company v. Federal Radio Commission. (1930)
59 App. D. C. 197, 37 F. (2d) 993 as appearing in (1931) 1 J. Radio L.
39-40.
22
For the corresponding privilege to telegraph companies, based on
their duty as common carriers, see footnotes 126-129 below, with accompanying text.
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caster transmitted without limit to all the members of tile radio
public who have been induced to listen in for the tinie being, with
consequent widespread injury to the plaintiff's reputation. Taken
as a class, telephonic defamation as such is thus relatively harlless while defamation by radio constitutes the most dangerous
form of defamatory publication that the world has ever seen.
Applying the telephone analogy as a basis for determining the
broadcaster's liability is also open to the same objections from the
standpoint of the general welfare as have already been set out
above 12 3 in dealing with the contention that negligence should be
regarded as the underlying basis of liability.
4. The Telegraph Analogy.-Radio broadcasting is not
analogous to telegraph service. The contention has occasionally
been made that the analogy of the telegraph company ought to be
applied to determine the liability of broadcasting stations for the
publication of defamatory statements uttered by others into their
microphones.12'
That wireless communication first was introduced as wireless telegraph also lends a connotation of verbal
familiarity to this contention that may make it appear plausible.
It is very clear in telegraph cases that the customer furnishes
the message to be sent but that the telegraph company by its
voluntary active operations transmits the message to the recipienlt.
In this respect telegraph messages are strikingly different from
telephone messages where the transmission in the instance is autoniatic. In this respect, therefore, the radio broadcaster does resemble the telegraph company.
It is clear that the basis for the telegraph company's liability is
the law of defamation. It is plain that if the sender of the niessage was entitled to the defense of a privileged occasion the telegraph company as transmitter of that privileged message is entitled to the same privilege. There seems also to be no question
that if the message as such does not in the instance fall within a
recognized privileged occasion the telegraph company as transmitter is not entitled to any privilege where the defamatory character of the message was clearly apparent on its face.' 2 5 Whether
'2 3See footnotes 43-82 above, with accompanying text.
I 4See Davis, Law of Radio Communication 116-169. where the author

argues for the telegraph analogy as a means of avoiding the strict liability
under the law of defamation and applying instead "the more reasonable rule
of due care." In his discussion this author seems, however, to ignore completely the passive innocent victim. For detailed analysis and criticism of
that 2viewpoint, see footnotes 43-66 above, with accompanying text.

1 Authorities are carefully compiled in Smith, Liability of a Telegraph
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any separate privilege should be recognized for the telegraph company when the defense of privileged occasion does not apply to
the sender of the message but the defamatory character of the
message is not dearly apparent on its face is a question on which
there is a sharp conflict of authority. 1218 In some jurisdictions a
conditional privilege is accorded to the telegraph company in such
cases even though the sender of the message is not within any
recognized privileged occasion.12- - The basis for such a special
privilege to the telegraph company is that as a common carrier of
messages it is bound, under the law applicable to such public
utilities, to provide telegraph service for the senders of such iessages. The conditional privilege thus recognized is accorded to
the telegraph company not for its financial profit but in the interest of prompt and efficient service to the public of senders for
whom telegraph messages are required by law to be sent.121 It
may in this connection also be noticed that any publication of such
messages that actually occurs, to which the special conditional
privilege for the telegraph company may be held applicable, is an
extremely limited publication. It is therefore very unlikely in
most ordinary cases, in the absence of subsequent repetition, to
result in appreciable damages." 2

-

With reference to the question of special conditional privilege,
for the transmitter of messages, it is at once apparent that the
telegraph company and the radio broadcasting station stand in
diametrically opposite positions. The telegraph company is a
common carrier of messages. The radio broadcasting station is
not. 3 ° The one is under a duty to senders to accept messages
for transmission; the other is not. The special conditional privilege
to the telegraph company in case of defamatory messages is based
on this duty.' 3 ' No such duty existing in the case of the radio
Company for Transmitting a Defamatory Message, (1920) 20 Col. L. Rev.
30, 369. See also elaborate annotation of authorities in 63 A. L. R. 1118-1127.
126See footnote 125 above.
12-"A recent case taking this position after elaborate consideration of
the merits is Flynn v. Reinke, (1929) 199 Wis. 124, 225 N. W. 742, 63
A. L 8R. 1113.
12 "The promptness with which it dispatches its business is the test of
its efficiency and the measure of its service to public needs. Its service
should not be hampered without deliberation nor for light and transient
causes. . . . It seems apparent that the tendency of this rule [denying
privilege] would be to limit service and to deprive communities of the
privileges which it affords." Owen, J., in Flynn v. Reinke, (19-29) 199
Wis. 124, 225 N. W. 742, 63 A. L. R. 1113, 1116, 1117.
12963 A. L. R. 1117.
"3oSee footnotes 115-121 above.
"See footnote 128 above. See also statement of the Federal Radio
Commission, quoted in footnote 121 above.
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broadcasting station, no basis for such a privilege to the broadcaster for defamation by radio is available under the analogy of
the telegraph cases.
Again, radio broadcasting differs sharply from telegraphic
transmission with respect to the possible damage from such publication. As in the case of telephonic defamation, defamation by
telegraph in the ordinary course is published only to a very narrow range. The consequent damage to reputation, in the absence
of subsequent repetition, is therefore in most cases likely to be very
slight indeed. 13 2 On the other hand, in broadcasting by radio the
extent of publication takes the widest possible range and thereby
exposes innocent victims of such defamation to infinitely greater
damages to reputation. This constitutes a further reason why the
telegraph company's special conditional privilege cannot properly
be applied to broadcasters in cases of defamation by radio.
Furthermore, when comparison is made between the business
factors encountered in telegraph cases and the business factors encountered in connection with radio broadcasting, the two lines
of business are readily seen to be strikingly different in their
essential characteristics. The type of service rendered by each
is entirely different, is largely rendered to a different class of customers, and serves entirely different functions in the business to
which it is applied. Telegraph service is largely confined to urgent business correspondence between the individual sender and
his addressee. Radio broadcasting, on the other hand, in its business aspects is primarily an advertising medium. In its business
aspect radio broadcasting does not appreciably compete with the
telegraph company, but with newspapers, magazines, and other
advertising media. It performs the business functions and displaces the business services not of the telegraph but of the competing publishers of commercial advertising. On the business side,
therefore, radio broadcasting is very remote from the analogy of
the telegraph company, but is very close to the analogy of the
newspaper. 33
It may be added that a special conditional privilege to the
radio broadcaster comparable to that allowed to the telegraph
company going beyond any privilege for the speaker in the instance would be open to the same objections from the standpoint
of the public welfare that apply to the contention that in such
'332 See footnote 129 above.
'1 See footnotes 106-110 above, with accompanying text.
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cases negligence should be regarded as the underlying basis for
liability.-'3
5. Negligent Conduct as Publication-Carriers.-Asalready
seen, without transmission by the defendant to the understanding
of recipients there is no publication by the defendant.1 33 Where
the defendant by his voluntary acts intentionally transnits utterances which are defamatory or intentionally procures their
transmission by others to the understanding of recipients, the defendant is accountable as publisher.136 On the other hand, where
a defendant's proper and non-negligent acts, not in themselves
constituting transmission of utterances to any one, provide the
means or facilities seized upon by others for transmitting defamatory utterances, the defendant is not accountable for such publication by other parties.3 7 The manufacturer of the printing press
for instance would not without more be accountable for libels
appearing in a newspaper later printed on that press. So the
manufacturer of typewriter paper would not without more be
accountable for libels later typed thereon and communicated by a
purchaser of the typewriting paper.
Between these relatively clear cases of accountability and lack
of accountability for the transmission that in the instance takes
place are some situations more difficult to analyze. The defendant's
conduct in connection with the defamatory utterance in question
by itself may be neither intended nor sufficient to bring about the
transmission that results. The actual transmission may come about
by the apprehendable intervention of acts of others. Where intervention of acts of others with the defendant's acts in bringing
about the transmission that results is reasonably apprehendable
under the circumstances in question, the defendant is held accountable as a publisher.3 8 Holding the defendant liable as a
publisher under such circumstances rests on the analysis that his
act negligently contributed to publication of defamatory utterances by the acts of another. Such liability for negligent though
unintended contribution to another's publication of defamatory
utterances may be imposed for conduct of the defendant which
occurs either at the originating or at the transmitting stage of the
publication. Thus the defendant in keeping the custody of a
'34See
' 3 5See
2S6See
137See
' 3 6See

footnotes 43-82 above, with accompanying text.
footnote 29 above.
footnotes 31 and 33 above, with accompanying text.
footnote 30 above.
footnotes 139 and 140 below.
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defamatory writing, or in addressing it for mailing to the addressee,
may fail to use due care to avoid reasonably apprehendable interception by acts of other parties.3 9 Likewise, the defendant, in
carrying on other activities not in themselves involving transmission of any utterances to the understanding of anyone, may fail
to exercise due care to avoid reasonably apprehendable utilization
of his activity by others for accomplishing the transmission of their
40

defamatory utterances.1

It is therefore clear that responsibility for the publication of
defamatory utterances may rest not only on voluntary transmission to the understanding of recipients but also on negligent conduct. Where there is voluntary transmission to the understanding
of recipients of utterances that are defamatory and unprivileged,
the voluntary transmitter under the law of defamation publishes
at his peril, and questions of due care are in that regard immaterial. 14 1 Where the party's conduct in question does not by itself
constitute publication, he is still held accountable as a publisher
where through his lack of due care in that regard he permits his
conduct to be utilized by others in achieving the publication that
takes place.

14

2

Conspicuous among the instances where the defendant's acts
do not by themselves without more constitute publication is the
case of the mere carrier. 143 Mere carriage of parcels obviously is
not publication, not being in itself any transmission of any contents
to the mind of anyone. Such carriage may be utilized, however,
by those who seek circulation for libelous contents of letters, newspapers or books thus entrusted to the carrier for transportation.
Accordingly, if the circumstances are such that the carrier in the
139Allen v. Wortham, (1890) 89 Ky. 485, 13 S. W. 73; Runney v.
Worthley, (1904) 186 Mass. 144, 71 N. E. 316; Schmuck v. Hill, (1901)
2 Neb. (Unof.) 79, 96 N. W. 158; Hedgpeth v. Coleman, (1922) 183
N. C. 309, 111 S. E. 517, 24 A. L. R. 232; Powell v. Gelston, [19161 2 K. B.
615, 85
L. J. K. B. 1783 (dictum).
140Day v. Bream, (1837) 2 Mood. & R. 54; Layton v. Harris, (1842) 3
Harrington (Del.) 406; Arnold v. Ingram, (1912) 151 Wis. 438, 138 N. W.
111. See also Johnson v. Gerasimos, (1929) 247 Mich. 248, 225 N. W. 636
to the effect that a defendant who had orally communicated to another
certain statements defamatory of the plaintiff was not accountable in the
absence of procurement for their republication by the other in written form
in a newspaper.
141See footnotes 34, 35, and 36, above.
' 42 See footnotes 139 and 140 above.
' 43Among the leading authorities are the following: Day v. Bream.
(1837) 2 Mood. & R. 54; Layton v. Harris, (1842) 3 Harrington (Del.)
406; Arnold v. Ingram, (1912) 151 Wis. 438, 138 N. W. 111; Emmens v.
Pottle, (1885) 16 Q. B. D. 354, 55 L. J. Q. B. 51 (dicta).
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instance knows of the defamatory character of the contents of the
parcel carried, he is said to be accountable as a participator by
his acts in the transmission that resulted. Where the contents
of the parcels carried are known to be reading matter and such
reading matter is defamatory, the carrier having assisted in the
circulation is said to be prima facie liable as a publisher thereof.
If he shows, however, that he neither knew nor had occasion to
know that the contents were defamatory, it is said that he is not
accountable as publisher merely because of his acts of transportation alone, which have been seized upon by other parties as
means or facilities for achieving their desired publication. 14
Negligent conduct as publication, and the mere carrier analogy,
obviously have no application to the question of the radio broadcaster's liability for defamation by radio. Mere transportation of
a parcel by carrier does not constitute transmission of utterances
to the understanding of anyone, while radio broadcasting of utterances deliberately does that very thing. Such transmission in
radio broadcasting being intentional, the intentional transmitter
under the law of defamation is accountable as publisher irrespective of questions of negligent conduct in the manner of carrying
out the operations of transmission.

45

6. The News Vender Analogy.-Under the current authorities
the vender of newspapers and books is usually said to be prima
facie liable for publishing a defamatory statement contained therein, every sale being regarded as a new publication. To this is
added the qualification, however, that distributors of such materials, if they are not the original or main publishers, are not regarded as having published them if they prove that they neither
knew nor in the exercise of reasonable care should have known
of the defamatory contents of the book or paper sold. 1 4 6

That

under certain circumstances news venders are permitted to escape
liability on proof of due care has suggested the news vender
analogy as a hopeful alternative under which broadcasters have
asserted the claim to escape from the more burdensome liability
involved under the newspaper analogy which courts have already
applied to defamation by radio.147 Can such a contention be
144See footnote 143 above.
45See footnotes 34, 35, and 36 above, with accompanying text.
14rEmmens v. Pottle, (1885) 16 Q. B. D. 354, 55 L J. Q. B. 51;
Vizetelly v. Mudie's Select Library, Ltd., [1900] 2 Q. B. 170, 69 L. J. Q. B.
645; Street
v. Johnson, (1891) 80 Wis. 455, 50 N. W. 395.
"47"The broadcaster is in exactly the same situation as the news vender."
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sound? By what criteria can the soundness of that contention
be tested ?
It may be noted at the outset that the physical facts involved
in the case of the news vender in their bearing upon publication
resemble but remotely, if at all, the physical facts of broadcasting. 1 48 The news vender does not directly transmit utterances to
the purchaser's understanding, but rather delivers the parcel or
jacket in which the utterance is wrapped up. The purchaser of the
newspaper or book must himself by his own subsequent act open
this parcel and read the statement contained therein before that
statement can reach his understanding. Transmission by broadcasting carries the utterances in question directly to the understanding of the radio listener. There is no delay and no dependence on any subsequent act of the listener to apprise him of
the contents. Furthermore, the broadcaster's active operations,
as already seen, deliberately so shape the form of the transmitted
sound as to make it intelligibly and continuously audible to radio
listeners. 4 ' The news vender takes no part in shaping the form
of the defamatory utterance. Further still, and most important,
the broadcast is the first and only active publication. The broadcaster's voluntary active operations of broadcasting as the speech
proceeds simultaneously transmit the speaker's previously unpublished utterances directly to the understanding of the farflung radio audience. The broadcaster is an original and principal
publisher. He does not, like the news vender, play a merely subordinate part in the dissemination of statements published in the
first instance by another who is the first or main publisher. 150 In
all these aspects regarding the physical operations involved in
publication the radio broadcaster is a much closer, more active,
and more important participator than is the news vender. So far
as the traditional language of the news vender cases itself goes, the
broadcaster clearly is not within it. As a shaper of the form
of the utterances transmitted, and as a principal publisher in the
instance, the radio broadcaster much more closely resembles the
newspaper than the news vender.
Appellant station's brief (p. 9) on the second appeal in Sorensen v. Wood,
under name of Sorensen v. K F A B Broadcasting Co. (no. 28749, tnreported).
'4"For the physical facts of broadcasting see footnotes 8-27 above, with
accompanying text.
149See footnotes 14-23 above, with accompanying text.
15OThis feature on which to support the milder rule for news vender
cases is especially emphasized in Vizetelly v. Mudie's Select Library, Ltd.,

[1900] 2 Q. B. 170, 69 L. J. Q. B. 645.
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When attention is given to the business aspects involved, it is
even more dearly manifest that the radio broadcaster much more
closely resembles the newspaper than the news vender. In both
cases advertisers pay for the publication service provided. The
news vender as a rule is not paid by advertisers but must himself
acquire at his own expense the publications to be resold to his
customers. The radio and the newspapers provide actively competing business services both in the broad fields of commercial
advertising and in other systematically arranged publicity for
reaching or affecting public opinion. The news vender takes but
a subordinate part in the dissemination of the publications of
others. He furnishes commercial competition neither for the newspaper nor for the radio. Whether the comparison be made, therefore, from the standpoint of the physical operations of publication or from the standpoint of the business service and business
competition involved, it is clear in either aspect that the position
of the radio broadcaster much more closely resembles the position
of the newspaper than it does that of the news vender.
So far as the leading news vender cases themselves express
the reasons upon which those cases rest, such reasons manifestly
have no application to radio broadcasting. Not the mere lack
of knowledge of the contents but the peculiarly subordinate part
taken by the news vender in the dissemination of statements transmitted by other parties is the key to the application of the news
vender analogy.'
If the defendant's acts have played but a
subordinate part in the dissemination of statements published by
others, his knowledge of the contents may still under the carrier
and news vender cases be the occasion for enforcing liability as
publisher. If his part has been that of printer or first or main
251"The decisions in some of the earlier cases with which the courts
had to deal are easy to understand. Those were cases in which mere carriers of documents containing libels, who had nothing to do with and were
ignorant of the contents of what they carried, have been held not to have
published libels. Then we have the case of Emmens v. Pottle. . . . The
decision in that case, in my opinion, worked substantial justice; but, speaking for myself, I cannot say that the way in which that result was arrived
at appears to me altogether satisfactory; I do not think that the judgments
very dearly indicate on what principle courts ought to act in dealing with
similar cases in the future. That case was followed by other cases, more
or less similar to it [citing three cases]. The result of the cases is, I think.
that, as regards a person who is not the printer or the first or main publisher of a work which contains a libel, but has only taken what I may
call, a subordinate part in disseminating it, in considering whether there has
been publication of it by him, the particular circumstances under which he
disseminated the work must be considered." Romer, J., in Vizetelly v.
Mudie's Select Library, Ltd., [1900] 2 Q. B. 170, 179-180, 69 L J. K. B. 645.
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publisher, the news vender cases do not apply at all, but he is
subject to the ordinary strict liability imposed by tile law of defamation upon all principal publishers for the greater protection of
their passive innocent victims. The radio broadcaster is emphatically a principal publisher to whom, therefore, the news vender cases do not apply. He is even more emphatically a principal
publisher than is the printer. As already set forth at length above,
he not only transmits the utterances, but his voluntary operations
also deliberately so shape the sounds transmitted that they become intelligibly and continuously audible by radio listeners both
near and far. 5 ' No transmission of intelligible utterances to the
mind of any one takes place except by his voluntary broadcasting
operations deliberately adapted to that end. The broadcaster is
very clearly a principal publisher, to whom, therefore, the news
vender cases by their own terms are inapplicable.
Applying the news vender analogy as a basis for determining
the broadcaster's liability in defamation cases is also open to the
same objections from the standpoint of the general welfare a,
have already been set out above in dealing with negligence as the
basis for liability.153 The object sought through such argument
is in both cases the same, to relieve the broadcaster from liability
for defamation by radio. The answer, too, from the standpoint
of the general welfare, is equally cogent in either case. In both
instances the same considerations in the background are involved,
that there is no need and no justification for such sacrifice of passive and innocent victims in order to favor the most powerful
and most dangerous agency for defamation that the world ha;
1 54
ever seen.
2

footnotes 14-23 above, with accompanying text.
See footnotes 43-82 above, with accompanying text.
1-5"The extent to which one man in the lawful conduct of his business
is liable for injuries to another involves an adjustment of conflicting interests. The solution of the problem in each particular case has never been
dependent upon any universal criterion of liability [such as 'fault'] applicable
to all situations. If damage is inflicted, there ordinarily is liability, in the
absence of excuse. When, as here. the defendant, though without fault, has
engaged in the perilous activity of storing large quantities of a dangerous
explosive for use in his business, we think there is no justification for relieving it of liability, and that the owner of the business, rather than a third
person who has no relation to the explosion other than that of injury, should
bear the loss." Hand, C. J., in Exner v. Sherman Power Construction Co.,
(C.C.A. 2nd Cir. 1931) 54 F. (2d) 510, 514, 80 A. L. R. 686. See also
footnotes 44 to 52 above, with accompanying text.
155 3 See
1
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